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Article 3

OF BABIES AND BATHWATER: THE PROSPECTS
FOR PROCEDURAL PROGRESS
Richard L. Marcus*
INTRODUCTION

For me, this Symposium's topic recalls what a prominent
Manhattan lawyer remarked over lunch at an American Law
Institute meeting several years ago: "The worst thing they ever
did for civil litigation was to create a standing committee on
the civil rules." Having a standing committee meant somebody
was always tinkering with the rules; it would be better, he felt,
to leave the rules alone and to trust their evolution to careful
judicial interpretation. The events that prompted this Symposium show how thoroughly my friend's desire for cautious
continuity has been frustrated. Nowadays a leading question is
whether the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules can control, or even strongly influence, the pace and direction of innovation. And innovation does seem to be heading in several directions at once.
This Article examines the controversy that surrounds
these developments with a view toward preserving the valuable features of our existing system of civil litigation. As the
pace and diversity of innovation increase, there is increasing
risk that we will be throwing out the baby with the
bathwater.' The organizers of the Symposium suggest that we
try to determine who stands to win or lose due to recent or
proposed changes. My reaction is that, to the extent this focuses on a narrow self-interested approach to current controver" Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law, University of California.
Besides the participants in the Symposium, I received very useful comments on a
draft of this Article from Wayne Brazil, Paul Carrington, Mary Kay Kane and
Tom Willging. I am indebted to Amy Landers, Hastings class of 1993, Anne
Lackey, Hastings class of 1994 and Nick Humy, Hastings class of 1995, for
research assistance. All errors that remain are my responsibility.
1 Cf. STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION 71 (1989) ("[tlhe answer

lies not in throwing the baby out with the bathwater").
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sies, it points in a dangerous direction. I argue that we instead
should continue to endorse the pursuit of a neutralist
rulemaking process.
Part I begins with a review and brief evaluation of the
simmering controversies regarding civil litigation reform. It
emphasizes the difficulty that attends a neutralist reform
stance, notes the temptation of offering a political critique and
considers the challenge to trans-substantive rules. Part II then
surveys a series of episodes of reform in order to reflect on the
insights they provide about the current controversies. Finally,
Part III offers some observations about the pragmatic possibilities of progress through procedural reform.
I.

A.

CURRENT CONTROVERSIES

The Crisis Mentality

As Professor Robel observes, "Crisis rhetoric is enduringly
popular in discussions of the court system."2 Perhaps this reflects the difficulty of attracting attention to the dry problems
of court procedure in the absence of a crisis. But the pervasiveness and tenor of current crisis rhetoric seem to outstrip that
of recent memory. My reason for starting with the crisis mentality is that it tends to invite radical and hasty solutions to
problems-throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
This crisis talk can be separated into three related areas.
The first emphasizes the "litigation boom" image, which I admit to having invoked,' and the related notion that lawyers
are the cause of many, if not most, of America's woes. On the
quantitative level the emphasis has been on caseloads. Of
course, there have been other episodes of caseload growth.4 In
Lauren Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 115, 115 (1991).
' See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 436 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus,
Fact Pleading]; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Marcus, Myth and Reality].
There was, for instance, a burst of growth in civil filings in federal courts
between 1900 and 1907. David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L.
REV. 65, 123 (1981). England experienced a litigation boom in the 16th and 17th
centuries. See C.W. Brooks, Litigants and Attorneys in the King's Bench and Corn-
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any event, the more strident uses of recent caseload trends
have been quite simplistic as scholarly analyses, particularly
those of Professor Galanter, have blunted the argument from
statistics.5 Even officials of the Bush Administration have
acknowledged that the scare tactics are overblown.6 Although
popular with past Administrations, the broader attack on lawyers has been rejected even by judges appointed by those Administrations.' The academic arguments supporting the inflammatory attacks on lawyers have similarly been rebutted.'
As a result, the feeling that there is some pressing urgency
for change, which is fueled by the litigation crisis notion, appears to have been debunked in professional, if not political,
circles? Yet debunking these overblown claims has not left
satisfaction, much less complacency, in its stead. To the contrary, it is hard to find anyone who is fundamentally satisfied
with the course and condition of civil litigation today. Whether
or not Pound was right that some such dissatisfaction is inevitable,1" this pervasive unhappiness will fuel innovation.
The second type of crisis relates to control over innovation
and, more specifically, the rules for handling civil litigation.

mon Pleas, 1560-1640, in LEGAL RECORDS AND THE HISTORIAN 41 (J. H. Baker ed.,
1978).
' See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six: or, the Federal
Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921; Marc Galanter, Reading
the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Societ,, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
' See Stuart Gerson, Both Sides Are Wrong on Tort Reform. So What's Right?,
CONN. L. TRIB., May 18, 1992, at 20 ("The evidence does not support the view
that American society is everywhere being overwhelmed by torrents of new cases.").
7 See, e.g., Henry Reske, In Defense of Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 33
(Judge Roger Miner, "a conservative federal judge appointed by Ronald Reagan,"
attacked the president's Council on Competitiveness as "scapegoating at its
worst.").
' See Frank B. Cross, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the Economists,
70 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1992).
' Indeed, it is important to remember that the general public awareness of
this controversy is a matter of the last decade or so, and it might be expected to
recede from the public consciousness.
" See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 REP. OF THE A.B.A. 395, 395-97 (1906) ("Dissatisfaction with
[Aill legal systems among all
the administration of justice is as old as law ....
It is obvious, therefore, that
peoples have given rise to the same complaints ....
there must be some cause of causes inherent in all law and all legal systems in
order to produce this universal and invariable effect.").
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There is an intrinsic and unresolved tension about where the
power to make procedural rules should rest. There is a strong
argument for some unilateral judicial power over the process of
decisionmaking to preserve an independent judiciary,11 but
despite occasional references to such power,12 the Supreme
Court has not explored the possible limits of the idea. 3 Instead, it has contented itself with viewing the power to make
rules for civil litigation as a delegation from Congress; the
inherent power debate accordingly "really is of no practical
importance with regard to federal practice" because it is assumed that Congress has that power."
Of course, Congress did not make significant use of that
power until the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence surfaced in
1974. Professor Friedenthal saw that episode as a "contemporary crisis," suggesting that it "may have spelled the end of the
autonomous role held by the Supreme Court for the past 40
years." 5 During the 1980s Congress sporadically reviewed the
" Consider the views of Levin and Amsterdam: "There are spheres of activity
so fundamental and so necessary to a court, so inherent in its very nature as a
court, that to divest it of its absolute command within these spheres is to make
meaningless the very phrase judicial power." A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30 (1958); see also Michael M. Martin, Inherent

Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REV. 167, 193 (1979) (judicial supremacy extends to 'rulemaking
that is indispensable to the courts' functioning").
2 See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (regarding "matters
which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which federal
courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the
powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules") (quoting Lumbermen's Mut.
Casualty Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)).
" See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015, 1115-16 (1982) (Supreme Court has not adequately explored constitutional limits on court rulemaking). For an effort to develop a separation of powers
defense of inherent judicial power over procedure, see Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77

MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1319-22 (1993).
14 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-

DURE § 1001, at 5 (1988).
"1See Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A
Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 675 (1975). Professor Friedenthal's

proposal in 1975 was that the Supreme Court reassert control over the work product of the rules process. Even though the Court eventually voiced opposition to
being removed entirely from the rules process, the most recent bout of rulemaking
suggests that it has little desire to do as Professor Friedenthal urged. Thus, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's letter of transmittal accompanying the 1993 amendments to
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existing rulemaking arrangement and, in 1988, it eventually
amended the Rules Enabling Act to require greater openness
in the process, but not to require that the rule committees be
"representative.""
In this "new ballgame" for rulemaking,1" there may be
"large benign consequence[s]," 8 but there are also widespread
misgivings. For example, Professor Carrington forecasts that if
Congress is receptive to special interests' importuning about
rule changes, "the rule-making tradition is doomed to disintegrate,"'19 and Professor Charles Alan Wright worries that the
1992 approval of a variety of controversial amendments "will
jeopardize the continued existence of the court rule-making
process."" Professor Mullinex suggests that, due to Congressional meddling, the Advisory Committee may "go the way of the
French Aristocracy."2 Indeed, Professor Walker recently has
predicted that more intervention from Congress will occur
22
unless the discretion of the Advisory Committee is curtailed,
while Professor Burbank asserts in this Symposium that the
rulemakers have put their work at risk of legislative override
by failing to obtain empirical evidence on the operation of
23
current rules or proposed substitutes. Added to the risk of
overruling from above is Congress' expansion of local
rulemaking power under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
("CJRA"), which is said to effect "a revolutionary redistribution
of the procedural rulemaking power," leaving the existing rules

the Rules asserted only that "the Court is satisfied that the required procedures
have been observed," but hastened to add that "this transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the
form submitted." Letter of Transmittal, Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 403 (1993).
at 28
"r Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 402, 102 Stat. 4649 (codified as amended
U.S.C. § 2073 (1988)).
"' Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1035.
" Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE
161, 165 (1991).
19 Id.

at 166.

Ann Pelham, A Legend Worries, LEGAL TIZES, June 29, 1992, at 6.
21 Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 802 (1991).
' Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 455, 462-63 (1993).
' Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993).
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process "a quaint, third-branch vestigial organ."2 4 Understandably, assurances from the Rules Committee that it avoids
controversial subjects and that it is sensitive to the risk of
amending the rules too quickly and too often provide cold comfort to those concerned about the fate of the rules process in
the face of such dire predictions."
The third crisis might best be called a crisis of purpose.
Professor Resnik has labelled it failing faith.2 6 At mid-century,
civil litigation in this country drew its attitude from what I
have called the "Liberal Ethos"-that lawsuits should be resolved in court on their merits and that courts should eschew
technical detail." In large measure, this Ethos was enshrined
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which "have become
part of the consciousness of lawyers, judges, and scholars who
worry about and live with issues of judicial procedure."" As
we absorbed the ethos, however, familiarity bred a substantial
uneasiness because the unfettered liberality of the rules, combined with other developments, has created a litigation machine that often seems indifferent to the merits.
One reaction to this situation is to conclude that, if pursued to endgame, litigation produces bad results-the precise
opposite of the assumption underlying the Liberal Ethos. For
24 Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77 MINN.

L. REV. 375, 379 (1992).
25 See Interview with Hon. Robert Keeton, Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, The Third Branch (March 1993). For example, the amendment of Rule 50 in part to rename the motion for a directed
verdict a "motion for judgment as a matter of law" seems difficult to defend if
only essential changes are made. The Advisory Committee Notes tell us that the
amendment "effects no change in the existing standard," but that the name is
changed in part because the traditional name is "misleading as a description of
the relationship between judge and jury." FED. R. CIV. P. 50 Advisory Committee
Notes, 1991 Amend., Subdivision (a). Whatever the force of this criticism of the
traditional name, it seems a weak ground for abandoning a term that has been in
use for centuries.
" Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494 (1986).
27 See Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 3, at 439-40.
28 David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969 (1989).
' For example, Professor Alexander's recent study of settlements in securities
class actions confirms the suspicion that the mere fact the litigation apparatus has
been engaged may matter more to the settlement value of cases than the underlying merits of the suit. Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of
Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
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example, a leading federal judge told a group of newly-appointed judges in the mid-1970s that "[o]ptimal justice is usually
found somewhere between the polar positions of the litigants.
Trial is likely to produce a polar solution.. . ."" This message has produced enough judicial converts so that some see
among federal judges "an attitude that a trial represents a
judicial failure."31 Whether or not this represents a "flight
from law,"32 it clearly represents a profound malaise in the
Liberal Ethos.
In a way, this crisis of purpose lies at the heart of the
other two, for if we were comfortable that litigation is unlikely
to produce dramatically skewed results, we would be less concerned about increased filing rates. Similarly, were there no
reason to fear that something is horribly wrong, we would not
consider jettisoning existing arrangements, and the
rulemaking process would not be as strained as it is today.
Simply stated, what we need is an aspiration.
B.

The Difficulty of the Task

We are constantly reminded that judicial reform is no
sport for the short-winded, but this message usually seems
premised on the difficulty of changing longstanding habits of
" Philip W. Tone, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, in SEMINARS FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, 1973-75, at 57, 60

(1976).
31 Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REv. 1, 50 (1987); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered, Common
Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 909, 987 (1987) ("Some judges now feel that they have failed if they are
forced to hear a case at trial.").
Admittedly disenchantment with polar solutions is not the only reason jldges
embrace settlement promotion. For some, it seems the only way to cope with
mounting caseloads. But unless one were confident that settlements accurately
forecast trial outcomes (as contrasted with accurately predicting later settlements),
there is an implicit indifference to trial outcomes. The "clear-the-dockets" mentality
appears to place only limited emphasis on the substance of the settlements that
ensue. Indeed, as trial outcomes become scarcer, it is more and more difficult for
anyone to evaluate judicially brokered settlements by reference to such outcomes.
Although it is true that docket pressures tempt judges to compromise on "justice"
in promoting settlements, that impulse receives a major push from the suspicion
that trial outcomes themselves are too often skewed by excesses of the adversarial
process.
32 Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules, and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAiE L. REV. 693, 716 (1988).
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intensely conservative institutions. Clearly we live now in an
era when many of those tethers have loosened, perhaps resulting in a rule-making crisis where too many cooks spoil the
soup. Yet having a freer hand for innovation does not really
make the task an easy one, for designing procedures is in reality an extremely delicate matter.
These difficulties only recently have come to occupy center
stage in the academy. Less than a generation ago, civil procedure scholarship was largely riveted on issues of jurisdiction
and exploration of the Erie doctrine; once the locality, court
system and governing law had been selected, the prevailing
view was that designing the process for handling the merits
would be a rather straightforward matter. By now we have
learned from other disciplines and have reoriented ourselves
toward process. With these new insights, we find that choices
that the Liberal Ethos made simple now seem more ambiguous. But consider the alternatives.
Limiting ourselves to utilitarian approaches, we have at
one end of the spectrum Posnerian law and economics, which
posits that any procedure can be justified only if its prospects
of reducing the risk of error exceed its cost of implementation.3 3 Under this approach, if there existed a machine that
invariably and cheaply determined the correct outcome in civil
cases, it should be used in preference to other procedures for
resolving disputes, despite its inhuman operation. With regard
to certain civil procedure matters, this narrow economic analysis can be very useful. For example, the effect of fee-shifting,
widely supposed to promote valid claims and deter the assertion of groundless defenses, on careful economic analysis
proves to be much more complicated.3 4
But for most procedural issues this approach is too narrow. Even Jeremy Bentham, the great father of utilitarian
analysis of judicial procedure, acknowledged the narrowness of
this view. For him the critical objective must be apparent justice-that is, justice that the public (and perhaps the parties)
considers just.35 Professor Dworkin similarly concludes that
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOmIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.1 (3d ed. 1986).
3" See, e.g., Ronald Braeudigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee
Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984).
" Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial Procedure, in 2 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 21 (1843):
23
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any decent utilitarian approach must take account of values
beyond accuracy,3 6 while Professor Mashaw has fully explored
the failings of a due process jurisprudence limited to considerations of accuracy and cost." Without question, something
more needs to be considered.
The procedural justice school provides insight into what
the additional considerations might be by exploring the reactions of parties to the process they receive. Beginning with the
pathbreaking work of Professors Thibaut and Walker, which
showed that litigants actually value an opportunity to be heard
and to control process independently of the outcome, a literature concerning the values that process can have besides providing accurate results has developed.3" Yet to a significant
extent we are left to compare process apples with accuracy
oranges, the greatest irony of which is the possibility that
processes that actually impede accurate determinations would
nevertheless be important to apparent accuracy or to serve the
participants' desire simply to participate.
Compounding the problem further is empirical uncertainty. Whatever one seeks to achieve through innovations in civil
litigation, one must proceed on the basis of empirical assumptions or knowledge. In the first half of this century, the realists
pursued empirical data about law with sometimes stupefying
persistence. Increasingly, there are sources of rigorous empirical information on various issues of procedural reform. One
example is the deflation of overblown litigation boom talk
That a system of procedure be good-that it be well adapted to its proper end, it is not sufficient that the decision rendered in virtue of it be
conformable to real justice; it is necessary that they should be conformable to apparent justice: to produce . . . real justice, the only true way is
to produce apparent justice. In point of utility, apparent justice is everything;, real justice, abstractly from apparent justice, is a useless abstraction, not worth pursuing, and supposing it contrary to apparent justice,
such as ought not to be pursued.
Id.
33 Ronald Dworkin, Principle,Policy, Procedure, in A MATER OF PRINCIPLE 72,
102 (1985) ("[The] psychological fact that people generally mind an adverse decision more if it is taken facelessly, without their participation, . . . is the sort of
harm that figures in any decent utilitarian calculation.").
"' Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 41 (1976).
" See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988).
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through analysis of statistical and other empirical data. Other
forms of empirical data similarly can bring other arguments
down to earth. For example, Professor Hensler effectively
critiqued Professor Trangsrud's recent defense of the right of
litigants to individual trials in personal injury cases through
the use of social science research about the actual
powerlessness most personal injury plaintiffs feel.3 9 Indeed, as
Benjamin Kaplan suggested a quarter century ago, 40 and as
Professor Walker recently urged,4 ' field experiments could be
used to provide hard data on how proposed reforms actually
would work.
Much as this information may assist rulemakers in evaluating accuracy oranges and process apples, it is unlikely to
provide definitive answers in many cases. Moreover, such information can be immobilizing; if procedural reform could only
be adopted after being proved effective and safe in a manner
similar to the way that the FDA determines whether a new
drug can be sold, it seems unlikely that there would be any
formal procedural reform. The challenge, then, is to appreciate
and evaluate the pertinent policy concerns and make reasonable use of empirical information. This can prove surprisingly
difficult, but also yield answers.
For example, several years ago I undertook to reassess the
stated common-law preference for a live, in-court trial because
of developments that to me seemed to be eroding our actual
commitment to that mode of decision. Surprisingly, although
" Compare Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69 with Deborah Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths
and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89.
" See Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to Dean Acheson (March 2, 1967), reprinted in Stephen Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1966-67 (1989) ("I would insist
upon experimentation with live cases to the extent this would not involve illegal
discriminations among litigants.").
41 See Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted
Field Experiments, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (1988); see also Richard A.
Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 367 (1986) (arguing
that procedures should be evaluated by "accepted methods of (social) scientific
hypothesis testing"). But see Mullenix, supra note 13, at 1297 (suggesting that a
challenge to local practices implemented under the Civil Justice Reform Act
("CJRA") "is especially likely in those districts where the courts have implemented
new rules by applying those rules to a random (or selected) portion of the civil
docket").
42 See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the
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the conventional justification for in-court scrutiny of witnesses

is to assist the fact-finder in deciding who is telling the truth,
available psychological research (admittedly in rather different
contexts) suggested that making determinations of truthfulness based on face-to-face observation of testifying witnesses
might be less accurate than other methods of decision.43 Nevertheless, consideration of other factors such as public understanding of the case, acceptability of results and the value to
the parties of having their day in court persuaded me that the
tradition should be continued." If such a venerated feature of
civil litigation as the trial in open court can only be justified by
extended analysis, it is apparent that the task of designing
innovations is far more difficult than might have been expected
initially.
C. Winners, Losers, Neutrality and Ideology: The Political
Critique
Another way of approaching the problem is to disregard
the difficulties outlined in the previous section and do as our
hosts suggest-focus on winners and losers. Never mind what
grand scheme might be furthered or retarded by a given innovation in the civil litigation system, what matters is whether I
benefit or lose. This may serve to clear the head, focus
everyone's attention and banish the problems presented when
one tries to justify changes by the sorts of rationales outlined
above.
This attitude can be labelled the political critique, almust accord a rather broad meaning to the word
though one
"political."45 Procedural reform, we are told, "ha[s] always had

Future of Trial under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PIT. L. REV.
725 (1989).
Id. at 757-62.
Id. at 762-70 & 774-81.
Focusing on winners and losers arguably is not a political orientation. Certainly there are situations in which that is correct. For example, the campaign
waged by court reporters against efforts to adopt other methods for recording court
proceedings and depositions fits into no known set of political theories. Yet even
that effort is reflected in the political process. See, e.g., Tom Dresslar, Lobbyist
Reveals Clout of Professional Group, S.F. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1993, at 1 (describing
great success California Court Reporters' Association has had in killing legislation
to authorize alternative means of reporting judicial proceedings). Indeed, one of the
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a substantial political dimension, " " and we are therefore invited to "turn our attention to understanding and analyzing
the political agendas of the Rules."47 This orientation appears
to be quite different from the sort of utilitarian calculus suggested above, whether that is narrowly focused on costs and
error avoidance or attempts more broadly to take account of
"process values." Moreover, if the positions of the players are
derivative of their stakes in the outcome (rather than flowing
from some general view of the proper goals or operation of a
civil litigation system), those "neutral" values may be used as
window dressing for quite a different agenda.
In some instances those who seek to advance their interests through civil litigation reform are overt about what they
are doing, but many who seek advantage through reform proposals do not act so transparently. Thus, skepticism about
hidden agendas sharpens our antennae as we scrutinize arguments phrased as neutral. This is a proper attitude to take
toward much of the litigation crisis bombast that has become
so common in the last ten years. Though it is phrased in general terms and purports to further neutral interests of society
or the court system, in the hands of many this rhetoric seems
to be narrowly gauged to serve the interests of a certain sector.
And it does so by fomenting a pervasive uneasiness among the
general population-specifically, that as a consequence of the
1938 triumph of the Liberal Ethos we all are losers. This skepticism properly invites us to consider the motivations of the so-

witnesses testifring before Congress against the 1993 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was there to address only such issues. See also Rule
30(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Depositions: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of William K.
Slate, II).
In general, in connection with civil litigation reform there seems a close connection between concerns labelled political and the question of who wins and loses.
Thus, it may be urged that a given change should not be undertaken because it is
designed to disadvantage certain litigants (often the disempowered) or, even if not
so designed, because it will have that effect. If civil litigation reform is to be scrutinized through the lens of gains or losses for a given group, that seems to be a
political orientation.
" Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2050
(1989).
'4 Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2226 (1989).
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called innovators, whether the innovation in question is advanced by representatives of the insurance industry or by the
American Trial Lawyers Association. In either instance, the
real objective of the one proposing the change may be to become a winner, not to achieve whatever loftier goals are invoked to justify the change. Indeed, in a world in which proposals do emanate from interest groups and some players are
focused on their private advantage, it would be foolish to disregard motivation as a hint about both the desirability and likely
impact of proposals for change.
This sort of skepticism does not, however, deny the possibility that a given proposal could, regardless of its origin and
its supporters, actually be justified on more neutral grounds.
The political critique can be taken this extra step, however,
with the suggestion that everything is political and that neutrality is impossible. Thus, we are also told that because the
world is not neutral, there is no such thing as a neutral procedure.4" If that is the case, neutral arguments and neutral concerns will not matter except to the extent they provide window
dressing. All that matters is who wins and who loses.
I believe that, despite the difficulty of the choices that
must sometimes be made, neutrality is at least a pursuable
goal in designing procedures for civil litigation. Accepting this
view requires some effort at defining neutrality, and the definition is somewhat negative. As a starting point, neutrality is a
perspective that is not driven by the self-interest of the observer (or of those the observer "represents"), at least in the parochial sense that such self-interest is to be advanced at the
expense of the interests of identifiable others. Certainly there
may be substantial disagreements about the wisdom of choices
to be made,49 but if the choice is made on a basis of society" See Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance and Procedure in the Shadow
of Procedure: The Integration of Substance and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases,
33 B.C. L. REV. 211, 218 n.26 (1992) ("Of course, virtually any procedural rule can
have a disparate impact on those who can least afford lawyers or who have less
relevant information at their disposal."); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAV & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 49 (1991) ("Consolidation of lawsuits already
filed is not a neutral act, at least in this non-neutral world, in which some litigants are richer than others .... some have more time to spend on litigation, and
some lawyers have more resources than do others.").
" For example, relaxation of class actions may lead to overdeterrence. See
Kenneth M. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence and Conflict
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wide benefits, the focus is in the right direction. Thus, at the
heart of a neutralist perspective on procedure is an honest
attempt to fashion rules that will fairly accommodate the concerns of accuracy, participation and efficiency." Although attitudes toward these concerns may be colored by matters of
"ideology," that is not somehow a trump that makes the entire
exercise a charade.
Indeed, the very concerns of some who promote a political
critique of procedural reform actually reinforce the desirability
of a neutral aspiration in designing procedures. If the game is
limited to winners and losers, the losers are likely to be those
with the least power. Not surprisingly, identifying the ideological agenda behind certain reform proposals reveals that it
seems to have been the powerful rather than the powerless
who have recently sought advantage through self-interested
promotion of change.51 Perhaps, then, the message is merely
that one should fight fire with fire; if the powerful are using
civil justice reform to their advantage, the powerless must
fight back as best they can.52 Yet, almost by definition, this is
a losing fight. 3

of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 60-61 (1975).
"oProfessor Walker, for example, has recently offered the following set of criteria for action by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules:
(a) Civil rulemaking shall be based on adequate information concerning the need for and consequences of proposed rules;
(b) Civil rulemaking shall not be undertaken unless the potential
benefits to society from the rule outweigh the potential costs to
society;
(d) Among alternative civil rulemaking approaches to any given objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be
chosen; and
(e) The Advisory Committee shall set rulemaking priorities with the
aim of maximizing the net benefits to society.
Walker, supra note 22, at 481.
" Resnik, supra note 47, at 2226 ("It has not been civil rights litigants who
have sought open politicization of the rulemaking process. Rather, powerful repeat
players have begun to speak of 'court reform.'").
" Id. ("In short, the politicization of rule-making has already happened--caused
not by the vulnerable of the society but by the powerful.").
"3 In terms of the widespread concern with the impact of a variety of developments on civil rights plaintiffs, there is a certain irony to the political explanation for recent innovation. The general, and persuasive, view of much litigation
crisis rhetoric is that it has been fueled by prospective products liability defendants and/or their insurers. But there is limited indication that the effort has
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This view also assumes that the powerful have succeeded
in politicizing rulemaking, a conclusion to be examined with
some specific examples in Part II. If it turns out that the rules
are made by persons attempting in good faith to apply neutral
principles, despite the difficulty of that task, then there may be
an alternative to the losing fight. Thus, the source of the rules
may be key to their neutrality in aspiration. If so, it is important that the rulesmakers take care to avoid as best they can
the 64sorts of pitfalls that invite congressional second-guessing.

The critics sometimes recognize an interesting phenomenon-the main thrust of the political effort to influence procedure has been directed not at the Advisory Committee, but at
the general public and at legislators.55 Indeed, there seems to
be no direct effort to refute Paul Carrington's assertion that
the Advisory Committee can be expected to turn a deaf ear to
genuinely selfish arguments.56 It hardly follows that other potential rulemakers, Congress chief among them, will behave in
the same way. Thus, from one perspective the political critique
could be an attempt to blunt the efforts of others to politicize
rulemaking, a salutary goal.
Should the effects of proposed changes-the identity of
winners and losers-be entirely irrelevant to a neutral perspective? The answer must be that they should not; a sensible
approach would call for consideration of the likely effects of a
change, including possible gains and losses for identifiable
groups. But a neutral approach also implicitly accepts the

resulted in changes that provide important benefits for defendants in such cases;
certainly the level of attention hardly compares to the attention given to the reported impact on civil rights plaintiffs. It is hard to accept the proposition that
civil rights plaintiffs were the target at which the powerful in the products liability arena were aiming. Recall that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce supported much
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. From the view that reforms are animated by the
hidden agenda of the Business Roundtable, then, it appears rather like the powerful have fired their propaganda cannon but hit the wrong target.
" See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
"By and large . . . [the] work has been done not by letters written to the
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, but rather by lobbying efforts
directed towards legislatures and the public, by well-financed media campaigns, and by support for conferences and meetings to address and describe the "litigation crisis."
Resnik, supra note 47, at 2219-20.
" Carrington, supra note 18, at 165.
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possibility that uneven impact will be the outcome of certain
reforms, so long as it is not the principal objective. The judgment to be made, therefore, is whether some adjustment in the
general procedural regime should be undertaken to ameliorate
the impact on a particular group.
D.

The Trans-substantivity Tangle

Taking account of differential impact raises the contentious problem of trans-substantivity. Modern procedure usually
prescribes a single set of procedures for all cases; as Judge
Weinstein put it, "one stretch sock fits all."57 The single procedure approach, however, has recently become the subject of a
heated critique. Thus, we are told that "uniformity and transand that "transsubstantivity rhetoric are a sham, "
substantivity may have become the enemy of substance."5 9
Despite the vigor of this critique, in large measure it seems to
be making a mountain out of a molehill.
Originally the vision of simple and uniform rules of procedure may have been embraced partly for aesthetic reasons.'
That vision surely has been taken to extremes on occasion,
perhaps largely to provoke.6 ' But the critics sometimes seem
tempted in the opposite direction. They so vigorously emphasize the relationship between procedure and the substantive
rights being asserted that one is tempted to reverse Henry
Maine's famous comment 2 and suggest that procedure should
"TJack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1902 (1989).
" Burbank, supra note 40, at 1940.
" Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1501, 1507 (1992).
"oJanice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics and ProceduralReform, 89
MICH. L. REV. 352 (1990).
1 Consider, for example, Charles Clark's proposal that the Model Rules of Evidence be limited to "one broad rule of admissibility of relevant evidence," with a
few subordinate rules to qualify the main rule. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 433-34
(1989). It may be that Clark made this proposal as a counterweight to Wigmore's
desire that the model code incorporate his ponderous and detailed code of evidence, and that Clark's actual objective was for a code along the lines drafted by
Morgan, which ultimately was adopted.
62 "So great is the ascendancy of the law of actions in the infancy of courts of
justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in
the interstices of procedure." HENRY MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1907).
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be secreted in the interstices of substance. Viewed another
way, the point seems to be that there is no meaningful difference between substance and procedure.
Undoubtedly procedural rules can be important to the
vindication of certain rights, and different procedural rules
may be more important in different areas of law.63 But Justice
Harlan's point remains pertinent: the basic thrust of substantive rules-controlling primary behavior in society-is primary,
while procedural rules are secondary, and are invoked only in
connection with litigation.' Thus, although there is a large
"twilight zone"" in which rules may be classified as partly
substantive and partly procedural, there is also a large area
that is purely substantive, and these rules could be handled
under a variety of different procedures.
More basically, the point is that uniformity is purchased at
too high a price in predictability and legislative constraint on
judicial power. To be neutral and uniform, procedural rules
have to be written at a level of abstraction that imposes little
practical restraint on individual judges' latitude to make decisions. The stretch sock stretches too far. This of course recalls
a longstanding debate between rules and standards,66 and
raises serious concerns about the proper limitations on judicial
latitude.67 Although this point has force, it is not particularly
new and is met by counterforce.
The latitude built into modern procedure is largely due to
a functional orientation. Rather than trying to pigeon-hole
cases according to the legal issues involved, the rules focus on
the functional factors that influence the sensible handling of
litigation. These factors often include the substantive issues
0 "[Allmost every procedural rule may have a substantial effect on the outcome
of a case." 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 4505, at 27.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475-76 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
c Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450 (lst Cir. 1990).
" See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
' See Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 647 (1988):
Ad hoc judicial activity is hard to square with the notion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied in the same manner in all
cases ....
[Tihere is a troubling possibility that judges may indulge
their own preferences about kinds of litigation in expanding or contracting litigation opportunities.
Id. at 678.
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involved. It is therefore commonplace that questions about
procedure need to take account of the substantive law involved.
The "transparency" of modern procedure' assumes a substantial interaction and frequent synergy between the substantive
and procedural elements of a case. Moreover, it contemplates
that procedural learning and practices from one substantive
area can be borrowed for another.
A shift away from trans-substantive procedures would
erode or eliminate the positive effect of applying procedural
learning from one substantive area to another. Tightening up
on trial court functional directives could do a good deal more
harm than good, a point the recent unhappy experience with
the Sentencing Guidelines 9 emphasizes with excruciating
clarity. Moreover, nobody has offered a clear explanation of
how the substantive areas are to be divvied up for purposes of
particularized procedures. For example, as much as critics
emphasize the obstacles encountered in civil rights litigation
nowadays, there are serious problems in determining what
should be included in that category, if it is to be considered a
category at all.7" Indeed, the thrust of most recent efforts at
differentiating among cases in choosing procedural arrangements is itself functional, not substantive. Thus, we are invited
to develop refined procedural approaches for complex or simple
cases,7 evidently recognizing that a given substantive category could produce both complex and simple cases, and that the
category of "complex" or "simple" cases will include cases
drawn from a variety of substantive categories.
Except for a blanket indictment of the "formless" nature of
the trans-substantive orientation of all modern procedure, the
actual impact of the trans-substantive critique is relatively
modest. It does not reject the general idea of a common model
of procedures for most or all cases,72 but only asks that special
See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 628, 632-33 (1988).
"

See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea

for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901 (1991).
10 "[Clivil rights' is an elusive, or at least capacious, category ....

"

BURBANK,

supra note 1, at 69-70.
"' See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (1993) (inviting "systematic, differential treatment of civil cases that tailors the level of individualized and case specific management to such criteria as case complexity").
2 Thus, critics who recently excoriated a variety of developments in the Title
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circumstances be noted. This is not a revolutionary concept, for
we already have rules that are substance-specific. 3 But generalizing from these concepts comes with real risks and costs.
One risk is political. As has been fully explored elsewhere,7 4
separating out a specific substantive area constricts the focus
on the winners and losers in such a way as to magnify the
likelihood that those with greater power will be the winners.
As Professor Friedenthal pointed out in the mid-1970s, making
special rules for certain types of cases can have unnerving
consequences.7 5 Another risk is more general. By requiring
differentiation according to substantive type of claim, it complicates the handling of litigation, which today often includes a
variety of substantive claims in a single lawsuit. Thus, a shift
away from trans-substantive procedure threatens to create
losers of both the specific and general type. 6

VII area in an effort, among other things, to "explode" the myth of neutral procedure, ended up acknowledging that "[flor many, if not most matters, the general,
flexible Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may work fine." Baumann et al., supra
note 48, at 300 n.413.
" See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (requiring particularity in pleading of fraud).
14 See Paul Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2069-87 (1989).
" Friedenthal, supra note 15, at 673-74 (noting that political pressure led to
exemption from interrogatories for personal injury and wrongful death cases in
New York state court practice).
76 In at least some quarters trans-substantive procedure retains force. In
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intell. & Coord. Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160,
1163 (1993), the Court unanimously held that a "heightened pleading standard" for
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability, popular with a number of lower
courts, was invalid because it went beyond the formal pleading requirements of
Rule 8(a)(2). The Court rejected judicial efforts to engraft new provisions on the
federal rules:
Rule 9(b) does impose a particularity requirement in two specific
instances . . . . Thus, the Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the
question of the need for greater particularity in pleading certain actions,
but do not include among the enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were re-written today, claims against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must be obtained by
the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.
Id. at 1163.
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To examine further the above generalities it is useful to
reflect upon the light shed on present controversies by various
episodes of innovation. Ultimately, this necessarily brief review
suggests that there are considerable reasons for fearing that
radical revision today would jettison significant advantages
whether or not it would solve serious problems as well.
A.

The Nineteenth Century Legacy

Because the watershed for conscious procedural reform in
Anglo-American civil litigation is the nineteenth century, starting with Bentham's utilitarian critique, we should begin with
some reference to this era. Although we must be careful not to
assume that seemingly similar attitudes on some issues between us and nineteenth-century reformers show that their
views were identical to ours,77 there is much to be learned on
a general level from the reform experience of that era. First,
the justification for reform was a popularized crisis. In England, for example, the strictures of the writ system and its
attendant intricacies and delays created a "crisis" that was
supposedly "viewed by the public with serious concern." Ts
Second, the reform efforts provide reasons for uneasiness
about absolute commitment to either judicial or legislative
rulemaking. In England, after a royal commission recommended revising the pleading rules, the judges were allowed to design the replacement procedures, which were promulgated as
the Rules at Hilary Term. Confronted with objections to the
intricacy of the existing practice, the judges concluded that
what was needed was more precision and, hence, more intrica-

" See Subrin, supra note 31, at 932 (arguing that the Field Code was "not,
contrary to its usual portrayal, a parent of the Federal Rules").
"8See Edson Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39

HARV. L. REV. 725, 728-29 (1926). Sunderland, who later served as one of the
professionals who drafted the Federal Rules, was persuaded that it was critical
that "legal procedure was brought under public, not professional regulation ....
Early in the struggle it became perfectly clear that delegation of the control of
procedural technique to the legal profession was a policy which was socially unsound." Id. at 739.
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cy. The rules were a complete failure, although enthusiasm for
common law pleading continued among judges, and Parliament
had to step in and simplify things with the Judicature Acts. In
this country, by contrast, the impulse to reform came from
legislative commissions, principally in New York under the
guidance of David Dudley Field. That reform effort was hamstrung by judicial interpretation and also was ornamented over
time with legislative additions to what came to be known as
the Throop Code.79 Thus, the risk of both legislative success by
special interests and judicial sabotage emerged.
Third, the shared impulse on both sides of the Atlantic
was toward simplicity and away from substance-specific procedure. Thus, as much as Field's objective may have been to
confine judicial discretion, the current emphasis on tailoring
procedure to the substantive rights involved appears to be an
attempt to turn around a century and one-half of reform efforts.
Fourth, the political critique seems inapplicable. Certainly
the framers of the reform efforts would, as a matter of position,
be expected to favor entrenched interests. Field, for example,
was by his own description the most successful lawyer of the
day in this country, and he represented many of the largest
commercial interests."0 He undoubtedly had mastered the existing procedures, and it is hard to believe that either he or his
clients would have benefitted significantly from the relaxations
and simplifications that he sought to introduce. Thus, the
reform movement appears to have been motivated genuinely by
a neutral urge to improve the operation of the court system.
Finally, whether that effort worked is quite another matter. On this side of the Atlantic, we are told, judges effectively
resisted the relaxed procedures."' In England, perhaps because
of the relaxation brought about by the Judicature Acts, matters supposedly moved quickly to an impasse that is reminiscent of much we presently hear about civil litigation in our

"' Whether these legislative additions really complicated the original setup is
debatable, but at least in Field's opinion they watered down the enterprize.
" Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical
Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 316 (1988).
81 See McArthur v. Moffet, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (Wis. 1910) (referring to "[tihe
cold, not to say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from the New
York judges").
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country. 2 Thus, we have an ominous introduction to the limitations of procedural progress.
B.

The Adoption of the FederalRules and "The Golden Age of
83
Federal Civil Procedure"

The Federal Rules were also born of supposed crisis-this
time the difficulties created under the Conformity Act. A proponent of the Rules Enabling Act even told a Congressional
committee that "this is one of the things that is making Bolshevists in this country,"' certainly a remarkable piece of
inflammatory bombast. Anyone who is offended by the overstatement of today might be reassured by the degree of overstatement encountered yesterday.
Measured by contemporary standards, the drafting and
adoption of the Federal Rules was a remarkable accomplishment. Today, any amendment to the rules that emerges from
the customary rules process requires a three-year gestation,
but the entire original package was drafted in only two
years.8 5 Despite some claims that the proposed rules were
widely debated at the bar,86 it seems clear that the process
was not assisted or encumbered by the sort of public aspect
that now attends amendments. The drafting was done by a
group of elite lawyers and law professors who acted with little
empirical evidence. 7
For those concerned with the process of rulemaking or
with the hidden or overt agendas of the powerful, these should
be extremely troubling features. But the rulemakers' work
product seems to confound the expectations. The thrust of the

Samuel Rosenbaum, Studies in English Procedure, 63 U. PA. L. REV.
273, 289-91 (1915) (within ten years after the Judiciary Act of 1875 had relaxed
procedure, it was said that excessive litigation, particularly excessive discovery,
had run up the cost of litigation so much that the reforms seemed to be defeating
their own ends).
Weinstein, supra note 57, at 1906.
84 See Procedure in the Federal Courts: Hearings on H.R. 2377 and H.R. 90
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1922), quoted in Subrin, supra note 31, at 959.
Carrington, supra note 74, at 2119.
86 William D. Mitchell, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS 73, 79 (1949); 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1005, at 29.
' See Carrington, supra note 18, at 163.
82 See
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rules was to simplify and to provide access. Discovery, for
example, was broadened and largely released from judicial
control. In Professor Subrin's view, these changes had a truly
"revolutionary" character."8 They contributed to some fairly
revolutionary progressive effects in litigation. Broad discovery
and relaxed pleading did open the way for plaintiffs to explore
and expand new frontiers of substantive liability; the resulting
synergy between procedure and substance has rarely been so
visible.8 9 In a rather striking way, the openness of the rules
also paved the way for much social action litigation.
But this is hard to jibe with the view that the powerful
will favor their own interests. Indeed, it leaves Professor
Resnik wondering "[wihy were these gentlemen, often associated with interests linked today to the 'defense bar,' sounding
(from our latter-day perspective) so much like 'plaintiffs'
lawyers?"'90 Perhaps they failed to ask the question we are
invited to address today-Who are the winners or losers if our
proposals go through? In some areas, it is likely that they
could not have foreseen the impact their changes actually
had. 1 But as to other matters they clearly did foresee the po2
tentially epic nature of the changes they wrought.
One answer might be that these lawyers had a personal
agenda. As members of elite law firms, they might have foreseen the growth of national law firms and concluded that a
national procedural code stressing relaxed pleading and broad

8 Subrin, supra note 31, at 925.
89 See, e.g., Jack Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806, 818
(1981) ("The ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to obtain a corporate defendant's records, to depose corporate employees, and to send searching interrogatories has

had a substantial impact in particular areas of law, and is one important factor in
the dramatic increase in cases filed.").
Resnik, supra note 26, at 500.
See, e.g., Geoffery C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive
Virtues of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246
(1989) ("Th[e] relationship between civil justice and social justice was not anticipated in 1938. The social wrongs whose remediation is assisted by the Federal
Rules in the present era had not then appeared on the civil litigation agenda.");
see also Larry Kramer, "The One-Eyed Jacks are Kings":" Improving Congress's
Ability to Regulate the Use of Judicial Resources, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73,
78 (1991) (I doubt that many people in the mid-1950's anticipated how important
civil rights cases have become.").
92 The potential of broad discovery, in particular, unnerved some of them.
Subrin, supra note 31, at 977-78.
'o
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discovery would assist enterprises like their own. After all, the
likely growth of large law firms had been urged as a reason to
reject the Rules Enabling Act. 3 But the argument does not
wash. By the time the drafters had assembled, the idea of a
national code had been fixed by the passage of the Rules Enabling Act; the choices the drafters made had to do with the
content of that code. The choices they made, therefore, are hard
to relate to their self-interest. Litigation was then the poor
step-sister in most elite law firms, 4 and the prospect of a growing litigation practice as a mainstay of an elite law firm would
have been unlikely to occur to these lawyers. Moreover, the
emergence of national law firms in the litigation arena depended far more on other factors-improved telecommunications, jet
airplanes, word processing and the like-than on the relaxed
provisions of the Federal Rules.
The more plausible answer is that the framers did not
pause long to identify winners and losers. True, while the
Federal Rules drew their essence from equity because "people
with identifiable agendas wanted it," 9" the drafters' desire
was not the product of a plan to benefit or debilitate certain
litigants or classes of litigants. It appears, rather, to have been
the result of a judgment about what would best serve the interests of the litigation system and, derivatively, society. In

"'

Professor Subrin quotes a letter from a West Virginia lawyer objecting to

uniformity:
[A] firm in a great city may represent a railroad, or an industrial company doing business in many states[;] if the procedure in the Federal
Courts is uniform this city firm can, itself, conduct the main parts of the
litigation and reduce the local lawyers substantially to filing clerks and
advisors on jurors. Uniformity, therefore, increases the influence and
importance of the great city firm, having at its head, perhaps, some
business man masquerading as a lawyer ....
Uniformity would further
augment the importance of large aggregations of men and depress the
individual ....
See Subrin, supra note 46, at 2009.
'9 See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 6-7, 16-17 (1991) (describing disdain of
elite law firms for litigation). A variety of factors explain the relatively recent
emergence of litigation as a major profit center in law firms. Dean Garth, for
example, calls our attention to the "litigation explosion" in the 1970s and 1980s of
corporations suing other corporations. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to
Private Justce: Legal Practice at War With the Profession and its Values, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 931 (1993).
"' Subrin, supra note 31, at 914.
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fact, they were pursuing the Liberal Ethos."
Assuming the framers were animated by an aspiration
toward neutrality rather than an agenda of favoring certain
litigants, there remains the possibility that they were wrong in
their judgments. Relaxed pleading and broad discovery could
produce undesirable results, and there were frequent protests
that the revised rules did so. Some lower courts tried to curtail
relaxed pleading, at least in complex cases, but were reversed
and chastised for doing so.9' It may be, as Professor Subrin
has eloquently argued, that many of our litigation ills today
can be traced to the choice made in 1936-1938 to adopt equity's
relaxed attitude for all civil litigation." Putting aside the question of whether there really is any other way to go, the point
for our purposes is that this choice fits within a neutralist view
of procedure.
The 1966 Amendment to Rule 23

C.

Few changes in the rules before the 1980s commanded as
much attention as the 1966 amendment to Rule 23, governing
class actions. This amendment originated with the understandable unhappiness with the original Rule 23, which called for
discriminations among "true," "hybrid" and "spurious" class
actions based upon questions such as whether joint or several
rights were presented. As Benjamin Kaplan, the Advisory
Committee's Reporter, explained in describing the amendments, the old rule was "a text burdened with a categorization
of rights at a high pitch of abstraction." 9 In place of that formalism, the drafters cast class actions according to functional
(and possibly overlapping) categories, a trend that may be
carried further in the near future under new amendments
presently being considered by the Advisory Committee. Although this reworking created a variety of new problems, it
was clearly a technocratic one in many ways.
Below the technocratic surface lurked larger implications

See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322-24 (2d Cir. 1957); see
also Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957).
See Subrin, supra note 31, at 982-92.
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REv. 356, 377 (1967).
'

'
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that some see as proving the failure of trans-substantivity.
Reflecting on the matter twenty years later, Kaplan said:
On its face, the amended rule appears trans-substantive. Yet one
could foresee that it would apply particularly in certain substantive
fields such as securities fraud; and, with no great flight of imagination, one might predict that the working of the rule must bring
about changes of substance .... [It did not escape attention at the
time that it would open the way to assertion of many, many claims
that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in the

throats of establishment defendants."0°

Writing in 1969, Kaplan had acknowledged the open-ended
possibilities of the rule, but also "confess[ed] that I am exhilarated, not depressed, by experimentation which spies out carefully the furthest possibilities of the new Rule."1 '
Dramatic developments did occur. The number of class
actions filed dramatically increased, and some judges may
have been too free in allowing them to proceed as class actions. °2 Partly on the strength of this enthusiasm, a new era
of public law litigation emerged. As Judge Weinstein put it,
"[m]uch of the environmental, consumer and securities litigation has
been made possible by an expanded class action
03
rule."'
Were all these results foreseen, and should they have
been? Arthur Miller has asserted that "the draftsmen conceived the procedure's primary function as providing a mechanism for securing private remedies, rather than deterring public wrongs or enforcing broad social policies."'0 4 Indeed, at the
time the rule was initially drafted in 1962, there had been only
a few civil rights actions, and "it would have required the clairvoyance of a Nostradamus for the Advisory Committee to know

" Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2126-27
(1989).
...Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 497, 500

(1969).
"

"Enthusiasm for the class action fed upon itself, and the procedure fell vic-

tim to overuse by its champions and misuse by some who sought to exploit it for
reasons external to the merits of the case. Mistakes, in most cases honest mistakes of faith, were made." Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664,
678 (1979).
103

JAcK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 16 (1977).

I1 Miller, supra note 102, at 669.
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that the class action eventually would be involved in thousands
of civil rights cases.""0 5 But it is clear that the drafters did
expect that there would be some impact in civil rights cases;
was drafted with that prospect specifically in
Rule 23(b)(2)
06
mind.

Whether or not foreseen, the effects nevertheless provoked
a reaction. Some, including some judges, screamed of "legalized
0 7 The Supreme Court erected jurisdictional barriblackmail.""
ers to state-law, small-claim class actions' and interpreted
the rule to require potentially expensive mailed notice to all
identifiable class members. 9 In employment discrimination
cases, the Court rejected the "across the board" rule adopted by
some lower courts and insisted that the commonality and typicality requirements be applied with care."0
Perhaps partly as a result of these equilibrating effects,"' class action filings in federal court fell off by the late
at 671.

'o'

Id.

WI

7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 14, § 1775, at 470 ("subdivision (b)(2) was

added to Rule 23 in 1966 primarily to facilitate the bringing of class actions in
the civil rights area").
" Milton Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
9 (1971); see Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968)
(criticizing suit as a "Frankenstein Monster posing as a class action") (Lumbard,
C.J., dissenting).
...Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
1 9 Eisen v. Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).-There is almost no academic support for this rule. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 27 (1991) ("There is little to
recommend the Eisen rule from the standpoint of economic analysis."); see also
Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) ("No (sane) person would
pay the entire costs of a securities class action in exchange for a maximum benefit
of $1,135.").
11 General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). For an argument that greater care was needed in the handling of Title VII class actions, see George
Rutherglen, Title WI Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688 (1980).
. Lest it be thought that all Supreme Court rulings curtailed use of the class
action device, it should be noted that there were others that were helpful to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (due process does
not require "opt in" procedure to protect personal jurisdiction interests and make
judgment binding on nonresident class members); Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank,
467 U.S. 867 (1984) (res judicata effect of unsuccessful employment discrimination
class action limited to claims of class-wide discrimination); Crown, Cork & Seal v.
Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983) (tolling of limitations period applies to claims of unnamed members of class in employment discrimination action where certification
denied on ground that named plaintiffs were not adequate and that their claims
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1980s." Meanwhile, however, innovation had spread in a
direction not intended in 1966-mass torts. The framers had
foreseen this possible use of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action and
expressed disfavor with it in a famous Advisory Committee
Note.' But they had not foreseen the growth in mass torts,
and innovative judges began to experiment with class actions
in that area. Many of the experimental uses of class actions in
personal injury cases were undertaken pursuant to Rule
23(b)(1), not the subdivision that prompted the restrictive
Advisory Committee Note. Some of those responsible for the restrictive note nevertheless concluded that it should no longer
be honored in light of developments since 1966."' Thus class

actions have recently been used in some instances of mass
repetitive injuries."5 Used in this way, class actions could be
seen as advantaging defendants, particularly if the cases are
handled as are mandatory class actions, and imposing undesirable fetters on plaintiffs. Hence the criticism of class actions
comes from a "political" source that urges their expansive use
in other situations such as employment discrimination.
What does this tale tell us? First, the rules process can
produce changes that appear to benefit the downtrodden, a
result that seems hard to square with certain versions of the
political critique. As the Reporter recognized, "establishment
defendants" might blanch at some of these developments, but a

were not typical); United Airlines v. MacDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (unnamed
class members could intervene to appeal denial of class certification); American
Pipe & Const. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974) (filing of class action tolls running of
statute of limitations for all putative members of class who opt in).
1.2See, e.g., Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class Action Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7.
3
..
A "mass accident," resulting in injuries to numerous persons, is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but also of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an
action conducted nominally as a class actions would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (Advisory Committee Notes).
1.4See RIcHARD MARCUS & EDWARD SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVEL PROCEDURE 384 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting Professor
Charles Alan Wright and Judge Jack Weinstein).
.. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rule 23(b)(3)
class action). There have also been efforts to adapt Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to permit a
"limited fund" class action in some mass exposure situations. See, e.g., In re School
Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 856 (1986).
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drafting group of elite membership, operating in relative secrecy, went ahead anyway.
A second insight is that substantial changes are likely to
produce periods of heady uncertainty followed by more moderate mastery of new procedures. The restraining interpretations
6
of later years may be seen as reflecting a hidden agenda,"
but they also fit the hypothesis that there is a pendulum that
gradually imposes constraints on new procedures. As experience with the device develops, appellate courts are likely to
7
impose increasing constraints on trial court latitude." Thus,
the fact that the more aggressive uses of class actions in the
early years were reined in later does not necessarily imply a
hidden agenda.
A third insight is to recognize the difficulty of predicting
who belongs in the "winner" or "loser" category. 1960s enthusiasm for using the class action as a method of banding claimants together has given way to 1980s and 1990s uneasiness
that use of the device will trammel the rights of plaintiffs and
permit defendants to steal a march on plaintiffs' individual
control of their litigation destinies."' Although the 1966 perspective might have been that a number of "establishment
defendants" would blanch at the increased availability of class
actions, the perspective a quarter century later is not so onesided. Some defendants may view class actions as an important tool to deal with widespread liability.
Accordingly, we are left with a textured view of the transsubstantivity debate. Doubtless the revision of Rule 23 had a
practical impact on a number of litigants, creating winners and
losers. Doubtless it also had an effect on the substantive law,
9 But
which was shaped by the dynamics of the procedure.

"' Robert Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil
Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2188 (1989) (referring to "the attack on the class
action device" as part of "the same agenda" that challenges the implementation of
Brown v. Board of Education).
117 See Henry Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 771-73
(1982). Courts sometimes recognize this process: "[Albuse of discretion can be
found more readily on appeals from the denial of class status than in other areas,
for the courts have built a body of case law with respect to class action status."
Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993).
1,8 See generally Resnik, supra note 48.
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (approving "fraud-on-the"
market" theory of causation which allows class-wide handling of causation issue in
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in a real sense this effect occurred because the device was
available on a trans-substantive basis. Whatever the
rulemakers could foresee, the framers could not foresee all
uses to which the device could be put. Instead, lawyers and
judges innovated from one substantive field to another. Although the most useful guides of interpretation on issues such
as the common question requirement might be other class
actions involving the same substantive claim, courts could use
their Rule 23 learning in one substantive area to branch into
others. Indeed, those who object to the use of class actions in
personal injury situations essentially recognize that the device
is trans-substantive and wish that it was not.
D. ManagerialJudging
If the 1966 amendment to Rule 23 represents the high
water mark of expansive procedure, managerial judging is a
symptom of judicial retreat from that open-handedness. For
some, it is "a sign of and a reaction to a procedural regime that
is in question and in decline, if not in its death throes."12 We
are told that "[alt base, the advocates of managerial judging
claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
work." 2 ' In some forms, the shift toward case management is
strong evidence of the crisis of confidence: "To the extent that
advocates of case management... give up on law application,
they are giving up on the essence of adjudication." 22 As suggested by these apocalyptic portents, the emergence of managerial judging says much about the new innovation in federal
procedure, but it provides limited support for the political or
trans-substantive critique, and suggests no intrinsic winners or
losers, unless lawyers themselves are a category of concern.
Managerial judging evidently grew from the innovative
actions of a number of judges in metropolitan districts across
the nation. Although related to efforts to handle "protracted"
litigation during the 1940s and 1950s,"' the broader managerisecurities fraud action by adopting a rebuttable presumption of reliance).
12 Subrin, supra note 80, at 311.
121 E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHi. L. REV. 306, 310 (1986).
"' Subrin, supra note 31, at 989.
123 See, e.g., Leon R. Yankwich, 'Short Cuts" in Long Cases: A Commentary on
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al impulse probably depended upon adoption of the single
assignment system, 24 and managerial judging was first urged
in the late 1950s and early 1960s.'25 The actual embrace of judicial management by a significant number of judges as we
now see it seems to date from the early 1970s. 2 6 It was embraced by the Advisory Committee in 1983 with the expansion
of scheduling directives in Rule 16, and was approved with
gusto by Congress in the CJRA in 1990.127 It has moved from
the periphery to the mainstream.
If one views the cardinal feature of the Federal Rules as
expanding the freedom of movement of individual lawyers and
litigants, this development seems retrograde. But Rule 16 was
always in the rules,' 28 and judges were able to fit much judicial management under the rules before the 1983 amendment.
Indeed, that amendment was designed in large measure to

the Report Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases Adopted by
the Judicial Conference of the United States, Sept. 26, 1951, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62
(1951) (commenting on pre-trial practices developed to adjudicate complex problems); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit
and District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1957) (discussing the use of pre-trial procedures in protracted litigation); Proceedings of the Seminar on ProtractedCases for
United States Judges 23 F.R.D. 319 (1958) (same).
124 See Resnik, supra note 26, at 523 & n.127.
12 See Resolutions at the Seminar on Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 319, 614-15
(1958) (asserting that the judge should "take actual control of the case and rigorously exercise such control throughout the proceedings"); see also Sylvester Ryan,
Effect of Calendar Control on the Disposition of Litigation, 28 F.R.D. 66 (1960):
The early and expeditious termination of a civil suit largely rests in
judicial supervision of litigation. A Court is charged with the duty and
obligation of supervision that is primarily directed to see that the claims
in issue are prosecuted and brought to final termination within such
short time as due process, justice and the reasonable interests of the
litigants allow and the facts of the particular litigation fairly permit. We
must be mindful that, while unreasonable delay should not be permitted,
justice is essential. Calendar control is but one phase of the judicial
supervision required to be exercised over all civil litigation.
Id. at 67.
12' See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 379
(1982) ("During the past decade, enthusiasm for the 'managerial movement' has
become widespread.").
12 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-82 (West 1993).

' Indeed, the English anticipated the movement by some time. An 1881 report
from the Lord Chancellor endorsed "a change in procedure which would enable the
court, at an early stage of the litigation, to obtain control over the suit, and exercise a close supervision over the proceedings in the action." See SAMUEL
ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AuTHORITY OF THE ENGLISH SUPREME COURT 75

(1917).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:761

prod other judges to follow the lead of their managerial brethren. Moreover, there is reason to suspect that Charles Clark,
the guiding spirit of the original rules, would have found this
development congenial.129
It is difficult to find in this development of the 1970s
grounds for declaring certain classes of litigants winners or losers. A more active judge might press either or both parties to
expedite preparation of the case. 30 Indeed, for those concerned
about power imbalances among litigants with great and few
resources, the substitution of the judge as a main actor in
litigation could be seen as a boon. An animating force also
seemed to be the experience of the public law cases that served
as the avatars for the movement to achieve social justice
through the courts. Accordingly, Professor Chayes made the
role of the judge the centerpiece of his epic 1976 article on
public law litigation. 1 ' As with the 1966 amendment to Rule
23, therefore, this development might be interpreted in political terms as a victory for the progressive forces. 32
1" "Clark distrusted lawyers and trusted judges. Indeed, recent procedural reforms that grant judges additional power to shape and control litigation are consonant with Clark's outlook." Stephen Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural
Outlook: The Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES
EDWARD CLARK 116 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991); see id. at 143 ("Clark was aware
that flexible procedural rules would expand the litigation process, thus necessitating a good deal of judicial interpretation and management.").
130 See, e.g., Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care and Mass Tort Litigation,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 409 (1992):
Judges could use their powers to tightly rein in defendants' efforts to
delay, stonewall and keep damaging testimony and documents out of the
hands of injured parties, and to urge the propriety of large settlements,
OR they could use their powers to impede plaintiffs by, for example,
limiting their discovery, limiting their ability to unite or to share information, liberally allowing discovery to be taken of plaintiffs that would
chill their vigorous prosecution of the litigation . . . and by urging plaintiffs to accept small settlements. I don't know whether an empirical study
of past cases would show that one or the other of these patterns predominates.
Id. at 420.
...Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281 (1976).
1" That image seems reinforced by the identities of prime movers in the field.
The movement was fueled by individual federal judges, and those who developed it
were not from the right wing of the federal judiciary. A leading proponent, Judge
Robert Peckham of the Northern District of California, was a life-long Democrat
and an aggressive activist in a variety of social action litigations. For a portrait of
the judge, see In Memoriam, In the Memory of Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham, 44

1993]

OF BABIES AND BATHWATER

This is not to say that case management could not validly
be criticized, and it has been. The critique, however, is based
not on political grounds but on the classical adversary vision of
Fuller,'33 and has prompted the response that it represents a
laissez-faire approach to litigation.13 From the procedural
justice perspective,' 35 this development erodes litigants' satisfaction with litigation by weakening their control over it. Another problem is that the traditional judicial role in our legal
system does not equip the judge to comprehend a case sufficiently to control it so fully, and the scheme of appellate review
in our system affords little real check on what the judge does.
13
Thus, one might see the seeds of a procedural apocalypse in
which judges manipulate forces to coerce the parties to settle
their cases.
Settlement promotion is indeed the feature of managerial
litigation most vulnerable to criticism, the one most likely to
foster a flight from law. Thus, Professor Fiss has criticized
settlement promotion essentially on the grounds that it adopts
the Fulleresque view that the parties should be in complete
control of the litigation.'37 He urges that the judge should take
responsibility for the litigation beyond the involvement of the
parties-essentially inviting some activism such as managerial
judging. One gathers that Fiss expects the judge's involvement
to benefit the outgunned party, 3 ' although there is no particu-

HAST. L.J. 973-89 (1993). If anything, one suspects that the more conservative
elements of the federal judiciary were less likely to take up the cry of managerial
judging. Moreover, there seems no reason to question the judges' motivations. They
were hardly seeking to reduce their workload. At least at the outset, active case
management took increased effort on the part of the judge.
" See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1979); Resnik, supra note 126, at 379.
3' Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Two-Stage
Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253,
264-65 (1985).
1" See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
1267, 1284-85
13 See Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REV.
(1987).
1" Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
.3 Of course, imbalances of power can distort judgment as well. Resources
influence the quality of presentation, which in turn has an important
bearing on who wins and the terms of victory. We count, however, on the
guiding presence of the judge, who can employ a number of measures to
lessen the impact of distributional inequalities. He can, for example,
supplement the parties' presentations by asking questions, calling his own
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lar assurance that it would. The basic point is that managerial
judging could benefit either plaintiffs or defendants and, therefore, is not generically likely to make either defendants or
plaintiffs the winners.
Nor does the managerial judging experience require acceptance of the trans-substantive critique. It does show that judges may constrain the moves allowed in individual cases and
opens the possibility of generalization for types of cases. But
this generalization may well turn out to be trans-substantive,
keying on the complexity or magnitude of the case rather than
its substantive content (except to the extent that affects complexity). The basic point again is that judges are restricting the
freedom of action of lawyers.
For our purposes, managerial judging may be most useful
as an example of the diffusion of innovation in federal civil
procedure. This innovation has resulted from a grass-roots
campaign by judges who experimented with the approach and
were happy with the results. Unfortunately, there is limited
empirical evidence that managerial judging actually achieves
what its proponents say it should, but the campaign was sufficient to persuade the Advisory Committee to sign on with
amendments to Rule 16 in 1983, to prompt Congress to embrace managerial judging as the hope of the future in 1990 and
to persuade the Advisory Committee to expand Rule 16's authorization for judicial management in 1983.139 Hence it is a
harbinger of things to come under the CJRA."4 °
E. Rule 11
If managerial judging is an example of innovation that
originated without significant involvement by the Advisory
Committee, the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 is surely a counwitnesses, and inviting other persons and institutions to participate as
amid. These measures are likely to make only a small contribution toward moderating the influence of distributional inequalities, but should
not be ignored for that reason. Not even these small steps are possible
with settlement.
Id. at 1077.
" The 1993 amendments included broadening Rule 16 to authorize more settlement promotion. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D.
401, 427-31 (1993) (Effective Dec. 1, 1993).
14' See infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
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ter-example that shows how the Advisory Committee can precipitate-although not control-significant change. But it is
hardly proof of the success of the rules process. No rule amendment has aroused more ire recently than this one. John Frank,
himself a member of the Advisory Committee that drafted the
1966 revision to Rule 23, called the Rule 11 amendment "the
most unfortunate exercise in rulemaking at least of the last 20
years."' The effort is often cited as proof of the critics'
views, but on closer examination proves more ambiguous.
To begin with, the concept on which Rule 11 was based
was hardly invented in 1983. David Dudley Field included a
"strong verification requirement" in his 1848 Code42 and the
Framers of the Federal Rules seriously considered but rejected
such a provision ninety years later.14 ' They did, however,
adopt original Rule 11, which required that pleadings be
signed in good faith and authorized striking them if they were
signed in violation of the rule. Everyone seems to agree that
this was a paper tiger, although it may have supported imposing some duty on a lawyer to investigate claims and defenses
before asserting them in a case.' Certainly there was widespread reluctance among judges (much criticized in some
quarters) 45 to impose sanctions, and particular reluctance to
punish clients for what was clearly the attorney's fault.
Most agree that the adoption of the 1983 amendment was
preceded by widespread concern about abusive behavior by
some attorneys and parties, although there is disagreement
about the extent of that abuse and whether, generally speaking, it came more often from the defense or plaintiffs side.
Persuaded that the problem was serious, although without
particularly impressive empirical evidence to support that
conclusion, the Advisory Committee hit upon "a return to the
oath as an attempt to gain some of the goals of the Field verifi-

141 John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agendafor Reform, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1883, 1886 (1989).
1..

Subrin, supra note 31, at 936.

" Subrin, supra note 31, at 977.
..See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some
"Striking"Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1,
54 (1976).
14

See, e.g., Charles Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67

CAL. L. REV. 264, 272 (1979).
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cation." " 6 The proposal excited considerable opposition on the
grounds that it would lead to a cottage industry of routine
sanctions motions, that it would poison relations between attorneys and that it would immobilize attorneys who were considering new and aggressive legal theories. The Advisory Committee protested in its notes that it wished to avoid chilling
attorney creativity, but stuck to its guns on adopting the
amendment.'4 7

It is hard to know what the framers actually expected that
the amendment would do. Given the ineffectiveness of the
original rule and the longstanding judicial reluctance to impose
sanctions, they might not have been surprised if the amendment had no significant effect. At least some commentators
protested at the time that the amendment would "emasculate"
Rule 11 because it eliminated the power to strike offending
pleadings. "8 Perhaps because of fears that the amendment
would have no effect, the Advisory Committee made sanctions
mandatory in the event of a violation.
Obviously the amendment did not sink without a trace in
the sea of litigation behavior. Instead, Rule 11 became the
hottest rule around, and reported decisions on sanctions multiplied. As Judge Schwarzer noted in 1988, "Rule 11 has become
a significant factor in civil litigation, with an impact that has
likely exceeded its drafters' expectations." "9
The amended rule was also the focus of heated commentary, for some academics, at least, seemingly created a cottage
industry of writing about Rule 11, most of it drawing on only
reported cases. Many of the original objections were renewed,
and the 1983 amendment was repeatedly attacked as having a
disproportionate effect on civil rights plaintiffs. Beyond that, it
presented numerous doctrinal difficulties. Some courts asserted
that it was a cost-shifting measure, finding that it was violated
on the basis of an offending lawyer's "bad" work product, without focusing on the actual investigatory activity of the lawyer
146 Subrin, supra note 80, at 331.
147
14

FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (Advisory Committee Notes to 1983 Amendments).
Jonathan Lerner & Seth Schwartz, Why Rule 11 Shouldn't Be Changed: The

Proposed Cure Might Exacerbate the Disease, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1983, at 13
("elimination of the motion to strike would effectively emasculate proposed Rule
11").
.. William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1013 (1988).
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in question. As Professor Burbank has put it, some courts were
"reading Rule 11 in the teeth of its language."15 It is hard to
see how the Advisory Committee should have foreseen this
development.
After the first burst of commentary, more careful empirical
work was undertaken, and it provided reason for more caution
in condemning the amendment. The Third Circuit Task Force
examined every instance in which the rule had been invoked in
that circuit during a year and issued a report in 1989 raising
serious questions about earlier analyses that looked only at
reported cases. Contrary to the cottage industry concern, it
found that Rule 11 had been raised by motion in only one-half
of one percent of civil cases in the circuit. 1 ' Moreover, the
frequency of Rule 11 issues did not seem disproportionate in
civil rights cases compared to diversity cases, although the
success rate of motions directed at civil rights plaintiffs was
disproportionately high, a circumstance the Task force attributed in part to uncertainty in the underlying civil rights
law. 5 ' The Task Force also concluded that the cost-shifting
and "product" interpretations of Rule 11 adopted by other
courts were wrong as interpretations of the amended rule and
wrong-headed as a matter of policy. A study by the Federal
Judicial Center, undertaken at the same time, found widespread support for the amendment among attorneys, but noted
a number of areas in which there was a high risk of being
sanctioned-securities, antitrust, commercial, RICO, employment discrimination cases, mass tort cases and class actions.153
As the Third Circuit Task Force recommended, more empirical work has been done, some of which has also yielded
mixed results. Professor Nelken, an early critic of the amended
rule, recommended in articles published in 1990 that the 1983
revisions be further amended but not repealed. 54 A Federal

...Burbank, supra note 40, at 1933.
,..See BURBANK, supra note 1, at 60-61.
.'.Id. at 68.
"I THOMAS WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 9-10 (1988). Willging
surmised that Itlhe common features of these high-risk cases seem to be complexity, high stakes, personal allegations of moral turpitude, and a difficulty in pinning down facts before filing." Id.
"' Melissa Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
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Judicial Center study of Rule 11 activity in five districts concluded that in those districts the rule had been raised in 2% to
3% of cases, but that there were actual rulings in only 48% to
79% of those instances. Moreover, where there were rulings,
sanctions were denied 58% to 80% of the time.155 Focusing on
civil rights cases, these researchers concluded that the frequency of motions targeting represented plaintiffs or their lawyers
was similar to that in other types of cases with substantial
Rule 11 activity (contract and tort cases) in four of the five
districts, and that the rate at which courts imposed sanctions
in civil rights cases was comparable to that for all types of cases.156 Even Professor Tobias, the indefatigable critic of using
the rule in civil rights cases, acknowledged in 1991 that such
developments "have led me to be more optimistic about Rule
l's application than I was several years ago." 57
In a more positive vein, this empirical effort has shown
that the amendment did have some of the effect the framers
sought-prompting attorneys to stop, think and investigate
more fully before taking actions in court.'5 8 It is impossible to
say how much of this caution should be considered evidence of
"chilling" effects. These consequences have prompted some to
suggest, perhaps tongue in cheek, that the rule should be declared a success and retired.'59
The Advisory Committee responded to the tumult, however, by issuing an unprecedented "call" for comment on the
rule. 6 ' It then circulated a proposal to amend the rule again,
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 385 (1990) [hereinafter Nelken, Chancellor]; Melissa Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 147 (1990)
[hereinafter Nelken, Impact].
...Elizabeth Wiggins et al., The Federal Judicial Center's Study of Rule 11,
FJC DIRECTIONS, Nov. 1991, at 8-9. The five districts were selected because they
used computerized docketing systems that allowed quick identification of all cases
involving Rule 11, and the study was limited to the period of time when these
computerized docketing systems were in effect in each district.
...
Id. at 22-23 (Memorandum from Elizabeth Wiggins, Thomas Willging &
Donna Stienstra to Readers of FJC Directions correcting Table 13 (Dec. 23, 1991)).
157 Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal
Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933, 953 (1991).
158 See, e.g., BURBANK, supra note 1, at 75-76 ("in this circuit, the Rule has had

an impact on pre-filing conduct of a kind that the rulemakers intended").
15' Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801, 815
(1992) ("The principal difficulty, litigation abuse, which prompted the 1983 revision, has been ameliorated . .
"'

").

See Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
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including a number of changes responsive to the critique by
the Third Circuit Task Force. After public comment, the Advisory Committee made some further modifications and sent
along a revised rule that, with one small but highly significant
change inserted by the Judicial Conference, 6 ' became effective
on December 1, 1993, and may go far toward abating the tumult.'6 2 Even John Frank, who urged abolition of the 1983
changes, pronounced himself happy with some of the proposed
revisions.'6 3 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, objected that
"[tihe proposed revision would render the Rule toothless."'
This is not an entirely happy history, and there are good
reasons for doubting the wisdom of the entire effort to police

litigation behavior with sanctions. But those objections do not
translate into support for the critics' more general views. The
basic objective of the framers of the 1983 amendment to Rule
11, however maladroit their work product, was to provide a
tool to combat what they perceived to be a serious problem in
civil litigation. When difficulties emerged with the implementation of the change, the Advisory Committee promoted study
of the issue, invited commentary and proposed changes to deal
with them. This is hardly an experience that supports conclusions about a hidden agenda inimical to the interest of certain
groups of litigants. Indeed, it might even be cited as evidence
Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990).
. As proposed by the Advisory Committee, the 1993 amendment to Rule 11
would have directed, as did the 1983 version, that on finding a violation the court
"shall" impose sanctions, but the Judicial Conference changed "shall to "may" in
the version transmitted to the Supreme Court which ultimately was adopted. Compare Attachment B to letter from Hon. Sam Pouiter (Chair of the Advisory Committee) to Hon. Robert Keeton (Chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure), May 1, 1993, 146 F.R.D. 519, 524 (1993) (explaining that
majority of Advisory Committee favored retaining "shall") with Rule 11(c) as transmitted to the Court, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 580 (1993) (court "may" impose
sanctions).
...See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 419-24
(1993). Among other things, the amendments make imposition of sanctions discretionary, limit the sanction to that needed to deter repetition of the misconduct,
provide that monetary sanctions ordinarily should not be paid to the opposing
party and provide a twenty-one day "safe harbor" during which a paper can be
withdrawn or corrected, thereby avoiding any sanctions. Thus, they respond to a
number of the concerns about the 1983 amendments.
" Henry J. Reske, Tinkering With Procedure, 78 A.B.A. J. 14 (1992) (quoting
Frank as saying that the proposed revision is "a major victory for our side.").
'" Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that empirical work can profitably inform the rules amendment process and, thus, as an episode that contrasts with the
current controversy surrounding mandatory disclosure, which
is discussed below.
Furthermore, the much-trumpeted negative effect on civil
rights plaintiffs seems a weak ground for condemning the
rules' trans-substantive orientation. It is still not fully clear
how substantial this impact has been. There is no reason why
the rulesmakers should have foreseen this development and,
unless we assume that they were lying through their teeth
when they cautioned against chilling creative advocacy, it
hardly seems that they intended this result (if it occurred). To
the extent a disproportionate impact on civil rights plaintiffs
has occurred, the reasons for it are still not fully understood,
although it may best be linked to a more generally unfavorable
reception of civil rights claims recently.'
Approached in terms of winners and losers, the Rule 11
experience is difficult to gauge. Behind the tumult the question
is whether the overall dose of caution in connection with litigation positions warrants the turmoil resulting from increased
sanctioning. Certainly overzealous use of Rule 11 seems to
have negative effects, much as it may have served the private
agendas of some judges. Perhaps, then, the most meaningful
lesson is caution; radical changes in direction not only make it
too difficult to predict winners and losers, but also loose forces
that the framers cannot foresee.
F. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
For loosing unforeseeable forces, the CJRA may have no
peer; surely it has been greeted in apocalyptic terms. Professor
Mullenix remarks that it "is fomenting a nationwide procedural revolution that is probably unparalleled since the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." ' She adds that it
was "stealth legislation"'67 and finds most disturbing "the
blatant as well as disguised political agendas behind the legis-

16

'

Nelken, Chancellor, supra note 154, at 404.
Mullenix, supra note 24, at 377.

,62 Id.

at 397.
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lation.""6 ' Professor Robel similarly finds the sudden appearance and passage of this statute as evidence of political ideology-the hidden agenda of insurance companies-capturing the
initiative in civil litigation innovation."9
The initiative for the legislation came principally from
Senator Biden, who arranged for the Brookings Institution
study on which it was based, and evidently arranged for some
of the funding for the study effort as well. Brookings produced
a slim report, on which the original Biden Bill was based. After
the Judicial Conference tried to head off that legislation with
its own fourteen-point program of delay reduction, Senator
Biden persisted and pushed through a revised plan within a
year of the issuance of the Brookings Report. 7 ' Since 1990, all
ninety-four federal districts accordingly have busied themselves with Advisory Group studies of local docket conditions
and development of district plans to cope with litigation expense and delay. Whatever else these efforts have produced,
they have proved to be a cottage industry for some academics-including this author 7 '-who are enlisted to serve as
reporters for local Advisory Groups at seventy-five dollars per
hour. The work product of these local activities has been somewhat uneven; while some have been cautious, others have been
extremely aggressive. There remains uncertainty about wheth-"
er districts must conform to the Federal Rules 72in their plans.
It is clear that some do not feel so constrained.
The entire experience thus far has been most troubling for
those concerned with responsible innovation. As Professor
Robel has pointed out, despite Congressional findings of serious delay problems, there was limited evidence, empirical or

!
10

17'

Id. at 439.
See Robel, supra note 2, at 115.
For a somewhat tendentious description of some of this history, see S. REP.

No. 146, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802,
6805-09.
171 I am the reporter of the CJRA Advisory Group of the Northern District of
California.
72 See Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil
Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1417 (1993) ("The baldest assertion of authority
appears in the plan for the Eastern District of Texas, which proclaims that 'to the
extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with this Plan,
the Plan has precedence and is controlling.").
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To the contrary, Congress

had available, but disregarded, a Rand Corporation study
showing no significant increase in delay in civil litigation in
the federal system since 1971,"74 a point seemingly within the
"golden age of federal civil procedure." Yet concerns about
delay in the federal courts had been around since the late
1960s 7 ' and are implicit in Professor Subrin's critique of the
Federal Rules, for expense and delay "seem like what one
would expect from an all-equity procedure system."176
The method by which the proposal was developed was also
troubling. Whether or not federal judges were consciously excluded from the Brookings Study, they were in fact conspicuously absent. It does seem that the rule amendment process
was consciously sidestepped; Senator Biden's chief aide later
derided the "near mystical reverence of the rule making authority exercised by the Judicial Conference."177 When the Judicial Conference opposed the bill, relations between it and the
Senate Judiciary Committee became decidedly chilly, and the
Committee report in support of the bill was rewritten to include an initial section with a heavy emphasis on the power of
Congress to make rules for the operation of the courts, which,
the report asserted, was much broader than the power of the
Supreme Court to make rules under the Rules Enabling
Act.17 Rather than rely on the Advisory Committee, the Act
adopted a "bottom up" reform orientation that rings populist
bells but seems designed to erode the authority of the national
rulemaking apparatus. The incipient antagonism between
Congress and the courts augurs ill for reasoned procedural
development.
...See Robel, supra note 2, at 115.
174See generally TERRANCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990).

...Letter from Benjamin Kaplan Reporter to Dean Acheson, Chair of the Advi-

sory Committee (March 2, 1969) (asking "whether our Committee should not turn
its attention to large procedural themes such as 'delay in the courts' which in the
end are far more important than technical questions of rule amendments"), reprinted in Burbank, supra note 40, at 1964.
...Subrin, supra note 31, at 974; see also id. at 986-87 ("An all-equity procedure may be so expensive that many legitimate lawsuits are not initiated.").
' Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United". The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 117 (1991).
'71

See S. REP. NO. 146, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1990), reprinted in 1990

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6811-15.
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The content of the Brookings proposals, and the thrust of
the Act, are similarly troubling. By empowering districts to act
independently on a variety of matters, perhaps without the
Federal Rules' constraint, the Act mandates a patchwork of
local innovation without concern for the process of federal
rulemaking. Indeed, to the extent it seeks to authorize intrusion into the minutiae of judicial activity, it may run up
against the hard core of inherent judicial power.'79 Nevertheless, this sort of intrusiveness may be expected from legislatures that become activists about speeding up courts. In California, for example, the Fast Track program has been imposed
on the courts as part of the Government Code, not the code of
civil procedure. 8 ' It may be that legislatures intrinsically approach court procedure on mechanistic terms, seeking to
achieve improved output by speeding up the assembly line.
Despite these ominous portents about the rulemaking
process, the CJRA experience provides limited support for the
critics' doomsday views. The political critique focuses on the
prominent role of corporate counsel in the Brookings Task
Force,'8 1 and the insight that "the [Biden] bill is being driven
by special interests."8 2 We are reminded that Senator Biden,
whose "single minded determination"'8 3 brought the bill to
prompt fruition, "is, of course, the senator from Delaware,
home of hundreds of corporations."" Anyone can draw the
obvious conclusion. But this conclusion seems too hasty. Undoubtedly the sparkplug behind the legislation was Senator
...Regarding state courts, Levin and Amsterdam conclude that an effort by the
legislature to "dictate to the courts every detail of their internal regimen" raises
separation of powers concerns. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 11, at 29-30.
They add:
Any statute which moves so far into this realm of judicial affairs as to
dictate to a judge how he shall judge, or how he shall comport himself
in judging, or which seeks to surround the act of judging with hampering
conditions clearly offends the constitutional scheme of separation of powers.
Id. at 32; cf John Papachristos, Comment, Inherent Power Found, Rule 11 Lost:
Taking a Shortcut to Impose Sanctions in Chambers v. NASCO, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 1225 (1993) (discussing origins and limitations of the inherent judicial power).
11 CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 68600-20 (West 1992).
'.See Robel, supra note 2, at 117.
...Avern Cohn, A Judge's View of CongressionalAction Affecting the Courts, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 103 (1991).
'
Mullenx, supra note 24, at 423.
'8
Robel, supra note 2, at 129.
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Biden, but his prominence, if anything, belies conspiratorial
theories. His vigorous personal involvement seemed to result
from a strong personal commitment to these issues as much as
fealty to Delaware corporations. Indeed, he apparently roused
himself from a hospital sick-bed
to direct an assistant to get
18 5
going on the Brookings project.
More significantly, it is hard to say who will benefit from
whatever changes result from the activities of CJRA Advisory
Groups. Professor Tobias reports that the planning process has
186
"fostered a healthy dialogue between the bench and bar,"
and the open-ended nature of the legislation provides such
latitude that innovation on the local level undertaken pursuant
to the Act could benefit anyone. Although some assert that fast
track procedures "are of greater benefit to the better-financed
parties,"'8 7 that conclusion is belied by the traditional reluctance of defendants to hurry to trial.
Another easy conclusion that looks dubious is that the
national rules process is mortally wounded by the
balkanization that local control may be producing. Without
minimizing the challenge to the rules process, it is important
to recognize that there were already substantial variations
among local rules from place to place. The Act might even
produce a modicum of greater uniformity if it reduces the tendency of judges to insist upon promulgating their own personal
rules. Even though the experimentation with voluntary disclosure under the Act was urged as a reason for delaying that
experiment on the national scale, the Advisory Committee is
hardly out of business at present (although it may be weakened by controversy surrounding the voluntary disclosure pro-

"8 Mark Gittenstein, who was Chief Counsel for the Senate Judiciary Committee and Reporter of the Brookings Task Force, describes the situation as follows:
Senator Biden, during his convalescence from surgery in 1988, called me
into his hospital room and said he wanted me to look at this issue.
What he had always wanted to do was try to create some sort of constituency outside the system for reform. So in the Fall of 1988 we convened
a meeting of distinguished members of the bar, who would meet on a bimonthly basis at the Brookings Institution.
Videotape of Program Court Reform: What Makes for Success? (May 17, 1990) (on
file with University of Pennsylvania Law Library).
1" Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil Justice Reform Act, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 122 (1993).
'

Cohn, supra note 182, at 100, 101.
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posal discussed below). Indeed, Congress has acted recently to
expand its authority to adopt rules that affect appealability, 188 and it seems likely that even on matters requiring legislative action, Congress will continue to rely on outside expertise, as it did with the supplemental jurisdiction statute.'
Nevertheless, the CJRA episode suggests that there are
good reasons to prefer the neutrality and care with which the
Advisory Committee approaches innovations. Whatever the
reality of a hidden agenda underlying the Act, it is undeniable
that moneyed interests have a more direct, even sanctioned,
avenue of access to the traditional political process. Moreover,
because Congress necessarily takes a sporadic interest in such
matters, it is more likely to embrace simplistic or mechanical
solutions. Accordingly, not only is the crisis mentality more
likely to prevail, but it can be expected to prevail at the thirtysecond sound bite level.
G. Mandatory Initial Disclosure
Our final development is the Advisory Committee's proactive response to the longstanding realization that in too
many instances parties play hide-the-ball with basic information despite broad discovery. A possible solution was to direct
that they exchange this information at the outset of the litigation without the formality of a discovery request. In 1990, the
Reporter of the Advisory Committee began informally circulating a "fairly radical""9 proposal along these lines. The resulting controversy illustrates the possible impact of approaching
procedural innovation in terms of winners and losers.
Although the concept of some mandatory exchange of information in litigation goes back further,' 9 ' forceful opposition
to the extreme adversarialness of discovery in civil litigation
...See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1993).
18' See Charles Geyh, Complex Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10
REV. LITIG. 401, 414-15 (1991) (discussing unique role of academics in regard to
court reform legislation).
" Mullenix, supra note 21, at 807 (citation omitted); see id. at 858-61.
...Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (mandatory disclosure of exculpatory
material by prosecution in criminal cases). Brady did not necessarily change the
world in criminal cases, however; "30 years after its inception, the Supreme Court
ruling has not changed criminal practice as dramatically as first was hoped." Cris
Carmody, The Brady Rule: Is it Working?, NATL L.J., May 17, 1993, at 30.
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can be traced to a 1978 law review article by then-Professor
Wayne Brazil.192 Similar initiatives were surfacing on other
fronts at approximately the same time; the Central District of
California adopted a local rule with disclosure features, and
two other districts later followed suit.9 In March 1983, the
ABA Journal carried a proposal by Gerald Glaser, a North
Dakota state court judge, that each party be required to disclose any information it possessed regarding a matter on which
it had the burden of proof.'94
192 Wayne Brazil, The Adversarial Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and a
Proposal, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1348 (1978).
19. Local Rule 6.1 requires that the parties meet shortly after the answer is

filed for a number of purposes, including the following:
1. Documents: To exchange all documents then reasonably available
to a party which are then contemplated to be used in support of the
allegations of the pleading filed by the party. Documents later shown to
have been reasonably available to a party and not exchanged may be
subject to exclusion at the time of trial.
3.
Other Evidence: To exchange any other evidence then reasonably
available to obviate the filing of unnecessary discovery motions.
4. List of Witnesses: To exchange a list of witnesses then known to
have knowledge of the facts supporting the material allegations of the
pleading filed by the party. The parties will then be under a continuing
obligation to advise the opposing party of other witnesses as they become
known.
C.D. CAL. R. 6.1.
Two other districts have very similar local rules. See S.D. FLA. R. 14 (adopted
Feb., 1984); D. GUAM R. 235(5). Evidently the Central District of California Rule
developed independently of the Federal Judicial Conference session described in
the text, and the judges of the Southern District of Florida learned of it when
Chief Judge Manuel Real of the Central District of California temporarily sat in
Florida. Telephone Conference Between Chief Judge Manuel Real and Richard
Marcus (Sept. 2, 1993) (notes on file with the author).
Testimony at hearings concerning the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 indicated
that these requirements were not applied by all judges and that meetings of counsel may have functioned more to establish a schedule for exchange of information
than to effect immediate disclosure. See Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Atlanta, Ga. 259-79 (Feb. 19, 1992) (testimony of Hon. Thomas Scott). Judge Scott, a former district judge in the Southern
District of Florida, described himself as "one of the few judges in the Southern
District of Florida who believed in the meet and confer rule and who mandatorily
,enforced the meet and confer rule." Id. at 261. Even Judge Scott, however, evidently expected the conference mainly to produce a schedule. See also id. at 28081 (testimony of Douglas Chumbley, a practicing attorney) ("My experience has
been, in the numerous Rule 14 meetings that I have had with opposing counsel,
invariably there are no documents exchanged, and there are no witnesses exchanged.").
194 Gerald Glaser, A New Law of "Supply and Demand" in Discovery, 69 A.B.A.
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In November of that year, the Federal Judicial Center
convened a Bench/Bar 'Workshop on Curtailing Abuse of the
Discovery Process" at which Judge Glaser presented his proposal, with Professor Brazil also on the panel as a commentator on the proposal.9 In 1988, Judge William Schwarzer (now
the Director of the Federal Judicial Center) advocated the
development of some such disclosure during a symposium at
the University of Pittsburgh Law School. 9 ' A year later, the
Brookings task force was the springboard for the CJRA's proposal for voluntary exchange, which was a reform to reduce
cost and delay in litigation; Congress listed it as one of the
provisions districts should consider for inclusion in their local
plans for cost and delay reduction.'97
Against this background, the Advisory Committee (of
which then-Judge Brazil was a member) produced a proposed
amendment to Rule 26 which was circulated for public comment.' Evidently the passage of the CJRA was an important
catalyst in the Advisory Committee's decision to act when it
' The Committee's initial proposal, circulated for public
did."99
J. 320 (1983).
"' See Bench/Bar Workshop on Curtailing Abuse of the Discovery Process (Nov.
14, 1983) (presentation of Hon. Gerald G. Glaser) (on file with author).
1" William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 721-23 (1989).
'9 See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (1990).
See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-89 (1991). During
roughly the same period of time, but relatively independently, the state court
system in Arizona developed its own brand of mandatory disclosure. See ARIZ. R.
CIV. P. 26.1; Symposium, Mandatory Disclosure and Limiting Discovery: The 1992
Amendments to Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1992).
"' Judge William Bertlesman (E.D. Ky.), who was a member of the Standing
Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure and the liaison to the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules, offered the following explanation for the Advisory
Committee's decision to proceed with mandatory disclosure in 1990:
The main factor in all this is somewhat political, not Republican or
Democrat political, but more economical political. It was the initiatives of
Senator Biden and the passage of the Biden Bill. Paul Carrington [reporter of the Advisory Committee] had been working on these concepts
for a long time, but when the Biden Bill passed, like so many things
happen-whether its the medical profession or the legal profession-when
a reform is proposed, all of a sudden the group says we better reform
ourselves or somebody else is going to do it for us.
So the incentive to get this started in the practical order, I think,
was the passage of the Biden Bill, when it looked as though the Judicia-
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comment in 1991, called for each party to provide, without the
need of a discovery request, information including the name of
any person likely to have "information that bears significantly
on any claim or defense," and a description of any document
the person possesses that is "likely to bear significantly on any
claim or defense.""'
This proposal provoked "a flood of objections unprecedented in fifty plus years of judicial rule-making." 0 ' The bulk of
opposition came from the defense side, which emphasized the
uncertain breadth of the duty to disclose and the potential
burden that it would entail for large organizational litigants.
Indeed, to the unbiased reader, that would seem to be the
main bite of the proposal, and that source of opposition was
predictable in character, if not in intensity. Less predictable,
though, was opposition from the plaintiff side. Almost as if
looking for something to object to, public interest plaintiffs'
lawyers protested that informal disclosure would hurt "information poor" litigants.0 2 Nan Aron from the Alliance for Justice was quoted as saying that if adopted, the proposal "would
end public interest litigation as we know it." 2"' There also
was academic opposition on the ground that the need for fur-

ry was going to lose control of itself. So the first draft was proposed in a
meeting at Duke University in October of 1990 and, as presented to the
meeting, there was a pretty complete draft on how this disclosure would
work. Senator Biden and whatever constituency he represents perceived
that there were great abuses, that the rules since 1938 had not worked,
that they had failed, that the billable hour and the necessity to produce
lots of billable hours was leading to unreasonable and oppressive discovery requests, and that something needed to be done to speed it up and
reduce expense and delay-that being the magic phrase in the Biden Bill.
So, for better or worse, that is how it began. I don't think anybody realized at that time, in October, 1990, realized how controversial this was
going to be.
Remarks of Hon. William 0. Bertlesman on "The Practical Implications of Discovery Reform" at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools,
Orlando, Fla. (Jan. 7, 1994) (audiotape on file with the author).
" Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 F.R.D. 53, 87-89 (1991). The proposal also directed that the parties
disclose expert testimony in the form of a written report, id. at 89, and expanded
the duty under Rule 26(e) to supplement discovery responses with subsequentlyacquired information. Id. at 96.
2. Ann Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovery; Litigators Erupt, Kill Plan to
Reform Federal Civil Rules, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1.
22 Mullenix, supra note 21, at 823-26.
23 Pelham, supra note 201, at 14.
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ther changes had not been demonstrated," 4 and criticism by
lawyers who objected that the Advisory Committee did not
include enough practicing lawyers." 5
In the face of this opposition, the Advisory Committee
regrouped and reconsidered. Initially it decided to shelve the
voluntary disclosure idea altogether and await information on
the experience of such programs adopted by districts under the
CJRA."' Then it decided to go forward, adding a requirement
that the parties meet and confer early in the litigation with
disclosure deferred until after that meeting, thereby shifting
toward the model presented by the three districts that had
adopted a modified disclosure system by local rule. It also
limited the disclosure requirement to information and documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleadings," thereby responding to some of the complaints
about the overbreadth of the original proposal." 7 In April

2' Thomas Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It
Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991).
2. See Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15 (arguing that practicing lawyers have constituted
a larger proportion of the Committee in the past, and that absence of practicing
lawyers prompted Committee to undervalue lawyers' obligation to protect attorney
confidences compared to their institutional obligations).
2" Some 20 Early Implementation Districts have adopted some form of voluntary disclosure. See Tobias, supra note 186, at 126. It might be helpful to consider
the provisions of one such local initiative. The Northern District of California requires that each party file disclosures within 90 days of the filing of the complaint. It specifies the following "Content of Initial Disclosures":
After making in good faith such inquiry and investigation as is reasonable under the circumstances, each party shall disclose:
1. The full name, title, work or home address and telephone number
of each person known to have discoverable information about factual
matters relevant to the case.
2. All unprivileged documents in the party's custody or control that
are then reasonably available that tend to support the positions that
the disclosing party has taken or is reasonably likely to take in the
case.
3. Copies of any apparently pertinent insurance agreements.
4. A computation by claimant(s) of any category of damages sought
or likely to be sought, e.g., in a counterclaim.
5. All unprivileged documents and other evidentiary material in the
party's custody or control that are then reasonably available that relate to damages, except punitive damages.
N.D. CALIF. GENERAL ORDER 34, § VII B (effective July 1, 1992).
"' See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401,
431-32 (1993).
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1993, the Supreme Court promulgated this amendment, and
the House Judiciary Committee promptly held hearings during
which opponents urged that Congress scuttle or delay the mandatory disclosure amendments to the Federal Rules." 8 Although the House passed a bill to this effect,20 9 the Senate
did not enact it and, therefore, the rules became effective on
December 1, 1993, with mandatory disclosure intact.2 1 But it
is fair to say the rule survived by the skin of its teeth.
Certainly this tumult shows that some people are approaching proposed reforms primarily in terms of whether they
will be winners or losers; it is tempting to accept Judge
Winter's exasperated conclusion that "even amendments best
characterized as trivial or incremental may encounter enormous resistance."21 1 On their face, disclosure requirements
seem to be a plausible effort to curtail some obstructive behavior and afford a shortcut to meaningful knowledge about the
evidence. Indeed, their thrust appears helpful to less-financed
litigants because they are designed to afford access to basic
information without the cost and delay of formal discovery.
Moreover, their bite would seem to be greater with larger litigants, such as corporate defendants.
The potential flaw, however, is that the entire undertaking
may be naive. The Advisory Committee's aspiration certainly
cuts against the grain of the adversary system as it has
evolved in the discovery context, and there is room for real
misgivings about whether the proposal will work. Far from
reducing controversies about discovery, the proposal could
backfire and provide another point of conflict, particularly with
its current invocation of Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement.
20 Although lawyers testifying were mostly opposed to the disclosure amend-

ment, John Frank testified that he disagreed: "I think that my colleagues [at] the
bar who are troubled at this Rule 26 are spooked over nothing. The plain fact is
that disclosure is the contemporary wave. The disclosure system adopted in my
own state of Arizona is so much more radical than this that the proposal before
you seems child's play." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and
JudicialAdmin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary Proposed Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of John P.
Frank).
2
H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
210 See, e.g., Randall Samborn, Rules for Discovery Uncertain, NATL L.J. Dec.
20, 1993, at 1.
2' Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L.
REV. 263, 263 (1992).
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As one district judge has objected, adoption of the proposal
could "lead to ancillary disputes" without "any useful purpose."2 12 But these misgivings hardly explain the extent or
stridency of the opposition.
The reality appears to be that many in the legal community fear that any change comes with a malign hidden agenda.
For the defense side, the agenda is fairly overt, and there are
some grounds for the suspicion from the plaintiff side. One fear
is that this proposal is an ice-breaker for the abolition of discovery. Some judges seem willing to reinforce that fear. For
example, when the tumult was at its peak, a district judge
began a reported decision by noting that "[s]ome observers of
civil litigation believe that discovery rights will be taken from
lawyers within the next decade or two, to be replaced by a
system of standard disclosures."213 Judge Schwarzer, in an
article supporting the changes, added another suggestion that
would be likely to stimulate fear in some quarters. He foresaw
that the requirement would work in tandem with Rule 11
because "those plaintiffs who lack the basis for a claim that
Rule 11 requires will likely be deterred because the disclosure
rules will leave them exposed."214 Those who are up in arms
about Rule 11 are likely to blanch at this prospect.
Despite these comments, there is little in what the Advisory Committee actually did to support the hidden agenda argument. Presumably in response to objections, the Committee
adopted a disclosure regime focusing on an early meeting of
counsel and implicitly recognized that the parties retain a
right to do discovery. 5 The narrowing of the requirement to
matters alleged with particularity seems to be a legitimate
effort to curtail what could otherwise be an incredible production burden. The process of adoption hardly supports the conclusion that a back-room fix was occurring to subvert the interests of plaintiffs. According to the official minutes, the debate

212 Pelham, supra note 201, at 16 (quoting District Judge J. Frederick Motz).
213 Wauchop v. Domino's, 143 F.R.D. 199, 200 (N.D. Ind. 1992).
214 William W Schwarzer, New Discoveries for the Discovery Process, LEGAL

TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 25.
215 See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401,
642-43 (1993) (Advisory Committee Notes explain that the rule requires an early
scheduling proposal to assure "that the commencement of discovery is not delayed
unduly").
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was confined to the merits of the proposal, and a newspaper
reporter described the discussion, in a somewhat disappointed
tone, as "highly intellectual and often tedious."2 16
What this episode shows, therefore, is the high level of
suspicion that now attends the reform process, a suspicion that
probably has resulted in part from focusing on winners and
losers. Perhaps lawyers are pessimistic by inclination, and are
better able to discern ways in which changes will hurt than
help them and their clients. But whether or not Charles Clark
was right to say that "the bar as a whole always opposes all
change,"217 it does seem that lawyers seeking to determine
whether changes will make them winners or losers have a
remarkable facility to find a dark lining for any silver cloud,
and probably a malign hidden agenda as well.
III. A PRAGMATIC PROGNOSIS ON PROCEDURAL PROGRESS: BACK
TO THE FUTURE?
Each of the above episodes was intended to achieve "progress" with procedural changes. Once there was great confidence that procedural progress was virtually inexorable. Forty
years ago Professor Millar was able to begin his study of the
history of procedure by positing a "law of procedural progress"
that procedure will move from rigidity to flexibility.21 Unfortunately, particularly recently, progress seems to mean removing some of the warts of the last set of reforms. Perhaps we
should abandon the promise of progress; it does seem that
current initiatives involve concepts that have reasonably close
parallels in the past. What we are doing in more or less radical
ways is tinkering with the system. This is a very pragmatic

21.Randall

Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NATL L.J., May 4, 1992, at

1.

Letter from Charles Clark to Douglas Arant (Oct. 8, 1934), quoted in Subrin,
supra note 129, at 118. Besides "client" interests, some mention should be made of
the self-interest of lawyers. However unlikely it is that the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure during the 1930s were feathering their own nests with
prospects of discovery profits for law firms, the litigation bar could be seen to
have a self interest in preserving the business of broad formal discovery that
might prompt it to oppose the 1993 disclosure amendments. See supra text accompanying note 95.
217

218

ROBERT MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PER-

SPECTIVE 5-6 (1952).

OFBABIES AND BATHWATER

1993]

enterprise, and the results are almost always susceptible to
attack as insufficient by those who entertain the vision of a
more perfect arrangement. In that sense, one of the major
obstacles for reformers (like presidents) is coping with the
shortfall between what they promise and what they deliver.
For the pragmatist, the question is not so much whether
changes achieve an ideal but whether they work an improvement. The above review of episodes of reform suggests a number of pragmatic reactions.
A.

Toward a New Paradigm?

To achieve dramatic progress, one must have a paradigm.
As Charles Clark put it, "[RIeformers must follow their dream
and leave compromises to others."21 Although the Liberal
Ethos presently is a weary construct, it has not been replaced
by another. Much as settlement promotion, cost-shifting and
sanctioning may serve as protective devices to rein in excesses
of the open-ended latitude of the Federal Rules at their most
expansive, they do not offer a new vision. Neither have the
critics of trans-substantive procedure offered any positive proposal. The point they seem to make in general is that unconfined litigation is just that-unconfined. Put more generally,
failing faith is not a new faith.
One obvious possibility is to seize on the growing ADR
mood as a new paradigm. From the perspective of some adherents, the conciliatory orientation of ADR is a new direction
away from the adversary emphasis of twentieth-century litigation. In limited areas such as family law, where the parties
will need to have ongoing relations with each other, this attitude may have some currency. But the conciliation paradigm
does not fit the bulk of settlement promotional activity. That
effort is caseload driven and often targets cases in which the
cost of litigation makes settlement a reasonable alternative.
More generally, the goal is to simplify litigation so that the
adversary conclusion can be reached without the impediments
of the ornate procedural apparatus which the Federal Rules
permit. Simplification where needed, or informal counseling
Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-58, Two Decades
of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUiJ. L. REV. 435, 448 (1958).
'21 Charles
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about the realities of litigation, do not seem to be evidence of a
new paradigm so much as efforts to cope with the existing one.
Alternative possibilities can be imagined, however, generally taking off from the movement toward managerial judging.
Looking to the Continent, some see a German advantage in
civil procedure that would replace the current party preparation of the case with judicial gathering of evidence."' This
would surely confine the litigation, but at the cost of important
elements of party control. Moreover, it would require a corps of
judge/investigators. The current move to more judicial control
is a coping mechanism more than an embrace of this paradigm. To go further would tend to blunt the creative synergy
between procedure and substance that has characterized civil
litigation in this century. Moreover, it bears noting the there
are some indications that the Germans are moving toward our
model as we adopt reforms that embody some features of
theirs.
More aggressively yet, we might respond to another strain
of criticism of trans-substantivity-that what matters are results, not process. Several years ago Professor Damaska explored the implications of such an approach, which he labelled
the "activist state."221 Interestingly, the imagery is the same
as that offered for contemporary procedure:
[P]rocedural rules and regulations in the activist state occupy a
much less important and independent position: procedure is basically a handmaiden of substantive law .... A proper procedure is one
that increases the probability-or maximizes the likelihood-of
achieving a substantively accurate result rather than one that successfully effects notions of fairness or protects some collateral substantive value. In this sense, then, the procedural law of the activist
state follows substantive law as faithfully as its shadow.2"

This vision resonates with the rhetoric of much current criticism, but Damaska's prescription for the activist state is neither accurate for current developments nor likely to sit well
with the critics of the current situation and direction of reform.
Thus, the activist state radically diminishes the role and importance of the party and lawyer, greatly enhances control in
2 See, e.g., John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985).
221
222Id.

MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986).

at

148.
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the hands of officials of the state, allows the decisionmaker
great latitude for involvement in the proceedings (including
some latitude for acquisition of knowledge extraneous to the
proceedings) and accords judgments little stability, leaving
them to revision in light of later learning.223 In addition, the
hierarchy of such a system reposes little discretion or final responsibility in judicial officials of the initial tier, which fosters
piecemeal disposition with frequent and plenary review by
higher officials. 4
The reality of the American tradition, and particularly of
much recent innovation, bespeaks the alternative model
Damaska offers-the "reactive state."225 In this regime, the
objective is to resolve conflict and the parties' autonomy and
control over the process are of great importance. This adversarial activity depends heavily on the involvement of counsel and, thus, the judge plays a relatively passive role. 6 The
principal judicial authority and discretion repose in the trial
judge, with the decision dependent on a single continuous trialtype proceeding, subject to limited review by higher officials.22 Whatever moves we have made or contemplate away
from the most extreme version of this model, we are hardly on
our way to embracing the activist state as our new paradigm.
B. Winners, Losers and Who Makes the Rules
Whether we switch to a new paradigm or struggle with
difficulties presented by our own, many critics (and the organizers of this Symposium) suggest that we might usefully focus
on winners and losers. In paradigm shifts, the implications
really make such speculation little more than guesswork because the long-term, and often even short-term, advantages are
so hard to predict. With more modest revisions it has become
very popular to approach matters on such a basis. In academic
circles the general trend is to try to further the interests of
certain plaintiff groups who, perhaps, can generally be characterized as the disempowered. Certainly other groups also have
"

See generally id. at 152-80.

22 Id.

"

at 47-56.

See generally id.
Id. at 104-46.
Id. at 57-62.
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self-interested perspectives.22 8
This tendency toward self-interested analysis has become
increasingly common in criticizing recent episodes of reform.
Whereas the adoption of the Federal Rules and the 1966
amendments to Rule 23 arguably prompted "establishment
defendants" 229 to initiate protective efforts to deflect or defeat
change, this effort did not make much headway.2 3 The strident turmoil over the proposals for voluntary exchange of information, on the other hand, shows how unabashedly various
litigants now pursue their perceived goals through the reform
process.
Nevertheless, little in experience suggests that this is a
tendency to be encouraged. Even without a new or riveting
paradigm, reformers can be moved by more than the self-interest of the loudest or best-financed supplicant, and this is the
orientation the Advisory Committee has assumed. Despite the
controversy surrounding some of the recent proposals, there is
no significant indication that the proposals themselves reflect
the importuning, as such, of those who might be affected. For
those who dislike specific changes to conclude that the wise
solution is to switch to another venue is a curious preference,
particularly for those who wish to protect the interests of the
disempowered. For the present, however, those who wish alternative venues will find a variety available. As the experience
with managerial judging and voluntary disclosure shows, reform has become a grass-roots affair among judges. The CJRA
makes it much more so, as well as providing a commission for
significant independence in innovation. In the absence of congressional deletion of mandatory initial disclosure from the
"8 Consider a recent article by Peter C. Schaumber in a banking journal regarding the Bush Administration's civil justice initiative entitled Lawsuit Reform
Would Help Banks, Too, Am. BANKER, Aug. 26, 1992, at 4.
22 Kaplan, supra note 100, at 2127.
s0 For an example of criticism of Rule 23 favoring that it be curtailed, see
Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 299
(1980). This is not to say that lobbying never moved the rulemakers before. Regarding a proposal to adopt a work product rule in the mid-1950s, a study of its
evolution reported that the Advisory Committee cut back on a preliminary proposal "due to the stiff opposition the preliminary draft met from insurance counsel
and railroad defense attorneys, groups with a strong interest in discouraging free
discovery of accident reports." Special Project, The Work Product Doctrine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 782 (1983).
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1993 amendments, local opt-outs from that provision may
blunt its effectiveness.
Congress, meanwhile, may be lurching toward greater
activism of its own;23 to borrow from another area, if the effects of the CJRA are not satisfactory "Congress may not per23 2
mit the judiciary to clean its own house again." This prospect is extremely disturbing. Apparently some have no compunction about inviting Congress to adopt special side-deals for
their favored groups, but the experience of the 1980s is not
a happy one even for them. As Paul Carrington has pointed
out, if the interests of the National Association of Process Servers can alter or supplant the rules process, what self-interested
mischief could more powerful and wealthier political players
accomplish?23 4 Even while lambasting the existing rules process in 1976, Professor Lesnick acknowledged that "[iut would
be difficult to find a supporter of a return to the days of legislative rule-making."2 35 Developments since then do not call
for a change of view. Those who support more activism by
Congress seem oblivious to the vast difference between what
they label "ideological" motivations behind recent proposed
changes and the reality of legislative lobbying activities by
special interests, especially those whose interests they do not
share.

"MThus, Professor Moore concludes that "[t]he events of the last decade suggest
that Congress is moving to reclaim some degree of involvement in the rulemaking
process, not withstanding the continued broad delegation of rulemaking power to
the court." Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1059 (1993).
" Stephen Burbank, Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial Councils and
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 283, 289 (1982).
' See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
801, 813 (1992) ("Congress should amend certain federal rules of civil procedure,
making the rules more responsive to the needs of civil rights plaintiffs.").
" See Carrington, supra note 18, at 165. Professor Carrington also describes
the 1988 modification of Rule 35 by Congress at the behest of Senator Inoye (and
without following the rules amendment process) to authorize a court to order examinations by licensed clinical psychologists, and suggests that this effort was undertaken because the Senator's daughter-in-law is a clinical psychologist in Hawaii.
Whether this effort was undertaken for the Senator's daughter-in-law is now unclear, however, more recent information suggests that it may have been undertaken for the daughter-in-law of Chief Justice William Richardson of the Hawaii Supreme Court. Letter from Paul Carrington to Richard Marcus (May 2, 1993). For
another account of the Rule 35 episode, see Mullenix, supra note 21, at 846-48.
" Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975).
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This is not to say that the rules should be immune from
Congressional alteration. The Rules Enabling Act clearly says
that they are not, and trying to insulate them completely
would probably be a step in the wrong direction. What is required is self-restraint. The CJRA confrontation between the
Senate Judiciary Committee and the Judicial Conference suggests the downside of a lack of moderation in the area. We
may hope that Congress will heed the wise words of Judge
Weinstein: "It is the good sense to avoid intolerable conflicts by
refusing to push the notion of independent branches of government to its logical conclusion that has made it possible for our
government to survive." 6
The Advisory Committee is not entirely helpless. In the
past it has fought for its work product. In at least one case, it
filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court in defense of its
rules." 7 More recently, its members have appeared before
Congress to testify regarding amendments, and a former Reporter even exhorted the American Judicature Society to come
to the support of the rules process."' Although such efforts
may have some effect, ultimately the principal question is
whether Congress will respect the process. If it does not, a
variety of winners in the legislative influence game may begin
to exercise considerable influence over rules they care about, a
development that would seem likely to make losers of us all.
But the political challenge to mandatory initial disclosure
should not obscure the reality that the rules process has nevertheless produced substantial changes in 1993. Even without
the much-maligned aspect of initial disclosure, the amendments add significant disclosure provisions and an array of
other important changes -- surely a significant package despite the likely deletion of the initial disclosure requirement.

WEINSTEIN, supra note 103, at 78.
W'
See Burbank, supra note 13, at 1115 (describing brief in Sibbach).
Carrington, supra note 18, at 166.
= Even if Rule 23(a)(1) had been deleted by Congress, Rule 26(a)(2) and
26(a)(3) would require other disclosures of consequence, and other amendments
alter a variety of important aspects of discovery and change the handling of additional matters, such as service of process.
'
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C.

Crises to Come: Fear and Loathing on the Reform Trail

The innate conservatism of the legal profession may explain the prevalence of crisis rhetoric in discussions of reform
of judicial procedure, but more seems at work recently. Taking
the initial disclosure episode as an example, the penchant for
alarmist responses is striking. Whether or not there is a crisis
that justifies the experiment with initial disclosure, it is obvious that many feel that the experiment will precipitate one.
On its face, the response is difficult to credit. Some such
°
experiments have been around for some time, and there
does not appear to be evidence that they have had the dire
consequences that were predicted, such as "end[ing] public
interest litigation as we know it."241 At least twenty districts
have adopted some version of voluntary disclosure pursuant to
the CJRA, and the world has not ended.242
What explains the response? One answer is that it is a
play for political attention. Unless an amendment proposal
threatens to cause disaster, Congress is unlikely to take much
interest in it except, perhaps, in service to the interests of such
groups as the National Association of Process Servers. Thus,
the strident response is a symptom of the growing politicization of the rules process; having concluded that a given
change will not make them winners, interest groups try to
paint it in the direst of terms. Even with such efforts, the
campaign to kill mandatory initial disclosure failed in 1993,
although more by happenstance than on purpose.
Another explanation for the tenor of this response is that
recent experiences have made some groups gun-shy about
change. Whatever its actual impact in actual cases, the psy-

211 See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 6.1, quoted in note 193 supra.

" See supra text accompanying note 203 (quoting Nan Aron of the Alliance for

Justice).

242 As Reporter for the CJRA Advisory Group for the Northern District of California, which has adopted a program of voluntary exchange that is fairly demanding, see supra note 203, I can report that preliminary indications are that it is
working smoothly. Put differently, there are no indications of the apocalyptic consequences predicted by some. As the initial study of our district's program concluded: "While it is too early to pronounce the pilot program a resounding success, it
also is clear that the pilot program has not had any of the disastrous consequences feared by some." Steve Albert, Early Study of Discovery Plan Shows Little Effect, S.F. RECORDER, Nov. 18, 1993, at 3; see supra note 208.
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chological impact of the amendment to Rule 11 may have been
very substantial in some circles. Similarly, the high-speed
adoption of the CJRA, over the objection of many judges and
seemingly on the strength of endorsements by corporate counsel, is a very threatening portent whatever the actual impact of
local changes in practice adopted pursuant to the Act may be.
Thus, there is a good deal of fear and loathing out there on the
reform trail. The political critique contributes to this attitude,
of course, by suggesting that there is a malign agenda, hidden
or overt, lurking behind the scenes, which taints even the most
benevolent-appearing reforms. If there is an atmosphere of fear
and loathing, it is not soon likely to be dispelled, for it results
from a loss of confidence in the rulemakers' probity or capacity,
or both.
One explanation for this skittishness is that there is an
exaggerated sense of the stability that should "normally" prevail. Recalling my friend at the ALI who wished there were no
standing committee on the rules, one has an image of a very
placid world in which radical change, or even significant
change, is rarely indicated. Perhaps civil litigation in this
country enjoyed such placidity for the 1940-1965 period, but it
seems more reasonable to expect that periods of stress and
turmoil will outnumber those of docile inactivity. As we are
now beginning to see on the international stage, the end of one
source of great stress does not eliminate all stress; the demise
of the Cold War may lead to more turmoil instead of less.
So crisis rhetoric and crisis concerns are here to stay, and
it will be a job for all of us to try to determine which are the
real crises. If dramatically wrong judgments are made about
that subject, the resulting reforms will ultimately produce few
long-term winners. For the present, outward signs suggest that
the most serious crisis for the federal courts involves criminal
cases and, only incidentally, civil cases. Certainly the silence
on this subject among those who decry cost, delay or other
aspects of civil litigation is striking. Moreover, it is hard to feel
that the growing law enforcement orientation of this society
produces any winners except politicians seeking reelection for
being tough on crime. The recent emergence of "three strikes"
proposals across the country shows that things are moving in
the wrong direction. If it is true that approximately twenty to
twenty-five percent of senior federal district judges are pres-
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ently refusing to take drug cases,24 that seems to be a sign
of a true crisis in the offing. Let us hope that political rhetoric
and interest groups do not deflect attention from it.
D. The Pendulum Effect and Societal Trends
The potential crisis over the War on Drugs underscores
another feature of judicial reform that can influence who is a
"winner" or a 'loser"-the pendulum effect of procedural revisions, and the political pendulum seemingly at work in society.
The political pendulum certainly connects to prominent
civil litigation issues. For those who exult in the social activism role of the federal courts during the post-World War II era,
any retreat from that commitment is a serious error. Presumably that social activism commitment is what Professor Fiss
had in mind when he said that "courts exist to give meaning to
2
our public values, not to resolve disputes." ' But federal
courts do exist in large measure to resolve disputes, not the
least because their power is limited to "cases and controversies." Moreover, much of the value pronouncement activity has
abated. As Professor Chayes has noted, even at the time he
was chronicling the emergence of a new public law model of
litigation in 1976, "[tlhe long summer of social reform that
occupied the middle third of the century was drawing to a
245

close."

The presidential elections of 1980, 1984 and 1988 represented and produced a spirit very unsympathetic to social

See Joseph B. Treaster, 2 U.S. Judges, Protesting Policies, Are Declining to
Take Drug Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A6 (reporting that "[flederal court
officials estimated that about 50 [senior] federal district judges are refusing to
take drug cases"). A review of the list of judges in a recent bound volume of Federal Supplement indicates that there are 257 senior district judges. 802 F. Supp.
VII (1993). Although the volume does not indicate how many of these are actively
handling cases, as of 1991, the records of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts indicated that there were 204 active senior district judges. Telephone conference between Richard Marcus and Karen Rudman of the A.O. (April
23, 1993). The New York Times article reports that two judges-Jack Weinstein
and Whitman Knapp-decided to refuse further drug cases to protest against national drug policies and sentencing guidelines. The reasons for the decisions of
other judges are less clear.
24 Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979).
24 Abram Chayes, Foreword. Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
21

HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1982).
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activism litigation. That attitude is evident in connection with
some social action litigation, such as challenges by nonwhite
parents to court-ordered integration schemes. Perhaps with the
national election of 1992 we have turned another corner. These
shifts should not come as a surprise; throughout our history
periods of social activism have alternated with periods of complacency, or "normalcy," to use Warren Harding's word.
This pendulum affects courts as well, albeit less rapidly or
radically. But in terms of judicial reform, there is another
pendulum at work. As Professor Resnik has observed, "[tihe
history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding generations's procedural reforms."246 That is what the retreat from the more aggressive
manifestations of the Liberal Ethos has involved, and it has
occurred at the same time as the more general retreat from
social activism by government. This coincidence also fuels fears
of hidden agendas; those who generally decry the trend of legal
decisions in certain areas lump together procedural and substantive rulings into a general denunciation.247 But like other
pendulums, this one will swing back at some future time. The
direction of the next swing might be affected by a new paradigm, were one to emerge. For the present, however, it seems
likely to swing back in the same direction if the Liberal Ethos
continues to provide the dominant paradigm.
E. Babies and Bathwater
The pendulum image emphasizes something that receives
insufficient attention nowadays-the thrust of modern procedure has produced many advantageous developments that
would be jeopardized by abandoning its neutral aspirations.
Those endorsing a more political rules process because they
expect to cut advantageous side-deals for their favored sort of
litigation need to realize that this litigation may have come
into existence in large measure because procedure has had a
neutralist and trans-substantive orientation.
Social activism litigation was only dimly foreseen or foreseeable at the time the Federal Rules were adopted, or at the
246 Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1030 (1984).
247 See, e.g., Baumann et al., supra note 48, at 212.
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time the Rule 23 amendments were drafted. Because those
reforms were shaped in a neutralist and trans-substantive
fashion, they created a litigation apparatus well suited to a
new type of litigation. Hence the avid resistance of many to
any dismantling of that apparatus as the procedural pendulum
swings back from the most aggressive embrace of the Liberal
Ethos. Thus, the question of winners and losers should be
considered with a longer view; in this view there is much reason to believe that the orientation of our judicial reform has
made social activism litigation a net winner.
Other forms of litigation also seem to be net winners. To
take the litigation most pilloried recently, product liability
litigation seems clearly to have depended on the flexibility and
ready discovery of modern procedure to stake out new substantive ground. Even Japan is reportedly considering expanding
consumer protection partly in view of the warnings its companies put on products sold in this country-but not on the same
products sold in Japan-to avoid product liability suits.248
It is impossible to predict with confidence where litigation
trends will go in the coming decades, although environmental
litigation seems a probable growth area. Whatever the trends
may be, the orientation of our trans-substantive system seems
likely to provide advantages to those seeking to expand the
law. True, the unruliness of the system has drawbacks, some
of which recent reforms have tried to control. But turning our
backs on this approach in favor of tailoring procedures to particular claims, or of cutting side-deals in procedure for favored
(or disfavored) claims, threatens to throw out the baby of modern procedure along with the bathwater.

2" See generally Andrew Pollack, Japan Debates Broader Power For Consumers,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1993, at Al. The story begins with Nintendo's explanation
that it provided warnings about risks to children on its video games in the United
States to protect itself from lawsuits, but that no similar warnings were provided
in Japan because product liability lawsuits were extremely rare.
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CONCLUSION

The placid prospect of gradual procedural evolution that
my friend at the ALI embraced seems to have been based on
wishful thinking. Far from stirring up trouble to justify its
existence, the Advisory Committee appears in many ways a
stable and cautious institution in the present climate of multifaceted and aggressive procedural reform in civil litigation. But
much of its recent work has provoked opposition that may
threaten its existence or power; calls for a moratorium on further amendments24 9 may in effect bring about what my friend
desired by neutralizing the Advisory Committee.
Increasingly, assessment of procedural reform has been
reduced to questions of winners and losers, with many urging
their preferred prescription as the only antidote for disaster.
Viewed through political lenses and in their worst light, recent
reforms can be characterized as harmful or worse. I believe
that this picture relies on overstatement. We need to remember that the task of designing procedures is extremely difficult,
and subject to criticism on a variety of sometimes inconsistent
grounds. We need to appreciate that those who undertake this
task can do so without hidden agendas, and that they seem to
have done just that whether or not influenced by some personal "ideology." Indeed, the agendas of the doomsayers seem to
have been advanced by a number of the innovations adopted
by the existing process. More recent changes, whether symptomatic of the procedural pendulum or of a more general political pendulum, do not necessarily pose the threat that the critics find in them. Even those innovations that appear to be
mistaken may result from something other than evil motives.
And yet the rulemakers need to appreciate the tethers
under which they operate. As the Rule 11 experience shows,
the Advisory Committee can loose forces that it may not have
foreseen even if it can try belatedly to rein them in. As suggested above, the turmoil that resulted from the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 should counsel caution about radical reforms.
Whether diffidence or delay might have been warranted on
mandatory initial disclosure, particularly given the vigor of the
opposition from broad sectors of the bar, is a difficult question.
2.

See generally Burbank, supra note 23.
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In the end, it is important to remember that the dangers
posed are real should the views of the critics prevail. Before we
turn our backs on the neutral and trans-substantive system we
have today, we should reflect long and hard on the benefits
that system has provided. Whatever the short-term advantages
of deals that may be arranged politically for favored types of
litigants or litigation, the long-term risks of throwing out the
baby with the bathwater seem to me very serious. Perhaps the
whole idea of procedural progress is in some senses deceptive
because it suggests that there is a perfection that can be
achieved where the reality probably is that tinkering is all we
will ever be able to do. Even if some of the tinkering recently
seems ill-advised, or the direction wrong-headed, the experience nevertheless has produced more winners than losers and
abandoning it could do the reverse without creating any surer
sense of progress.

